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THE DARK SIDE OF TOWN: THE SOCIAL CAPITAL
REVOLUTION IN RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY LAW
Stephanie M. Stern*
Social capital has pervaded property law, with scholars and policymakers advocating laws and property arrangements to promote social
capital and relying on social capital to devolve property governance
from legal institutions to resident groups. This Article challenges the
prevailing view of social capital’s salutary effects with a more skeptical
account that examines the dark side of residential social capital—its capacity to effectuate local factions and to promote restraints and inegalitarianism that close off property. I introduce a set of claims about social
capital’s dark side in residential property and explore these points
through the examples of local racial purging, land cartels, and residential
self-governance. First, contrary to the assumption of a social capital deficit, residential racial segregation and land cartelization, perhaps the
deepest imprints on the American property landscape today, suggest an
abundance of local social capital and possible unintended consequences
of interventions to build social capital. Second, “governing by social
capital,” or relying on social capital for property self-governance, may
empower factions, breed conflict, and increase the demand for residential homogeneity as a proxy for cooperation. In light of the mixed evidence for social capital’s benefits and its sizeable dark side, the more
pressing and productive role for property law is not to promote social
capital, but to address its negative spillovers and illiberal effects.
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INTRODUCTION

I

N 2007, accompanied by a firestorm of publicity, Robert Putnam announced that residential racial diversity causes declines in social capital.1 Social capital is a prominent theory, popularized by Putnam, of the
aggregate value of citizen participation in associations and organizations, social ties and networks, civic engagement, trust, and norms of
reciprocity.2 In a study of forty-one U.S. communities, Putnam found
that people living in racially diverse communities were less likely to
work on a community project or volunteer, less likely to expect others to
cooperate to solve collective problems, reported lower trust in others,
had fewer close friendship ties, expressed less confidence in local gov-

1

See Robert D. Putnam, E. Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first
Century, 30 Scandinavian Pol. Stud. 137, 144, 149–50 (2007).
2
See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone 19 (2000).
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ernment, and registered to vote less frequently.3 Most provocatively,
Putnam found a strong “hunker[ing] down” effect, contrary to both the
constrict and contact hypotheses of integration, where racial diversity
caused residents of diverse communities to withdraw from social and
civic life and to report lower trust in members of other races and their
own race.4
Unsurprisingly (to all but Robert Putnam, it seems), his research provoked a torrent of political commentary and academic response. Conservative commentators argued that the findings called into question the
value of racial mixing, headlines trumpeted the conclusion that “greater
diversity equals more misery,”5 and Putnam’s research featured in a recent amicus brief as evidence against the value of affirmative action in
college admissions.6 Sociologists and economists reanalyzed Putnam’s
data and conducted their own empirical studies to assess his findings
(these studies indicate that the diversity decrement is statistically significant, but small).7 Legal scholars accepted, albeit unhappily, the conclusion that racial diversity diminishes local social capital.8
3
After controlling for a host of variables at both the census-tract and individual level, including age, ethnicity, education, affluence/poverty, language, residential mobility, citizenship, commuting time, homeownership, region, gender, financial satisfaction, work hours,
crime, population density, and income inequality, there were reductions in social capital as
high as thirty to fifty percent for the most diverse communities as compared to the least diverse. See Putnam, supra note 1, at 148, 151–52.
4
See id. at 147–49.
5
Ilana Mercer, Op-Ed., Greater Diversity Equals More Misery, Orange County Reg., July
22, 2007, available at http://www.ocregister.com/opinion/putnam-59065-diversity-social.
html (“When an academic ‘discovers’ what ordinary mortals have known for eons, it’s called
science.”).
6
See Brief of Abigail Thernstrom et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 11–
13, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., No. 11-345 (May 29, 2012) (arguing that Putnam’s research reveals social harms that do not support contact theory and the claimed benefits to diversity);
see also David Brooks, Op-Ed., The End of Integration, N.Y. Times, July 6, 2007, at A15;
Georgie Anne Geyer, The Case Against Multiculturalism, Free Republic (Aug. 14, 2007,
2:02 PM), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1881086/posts; Michael Jonas, The
Downside of Diversity, Bos. Globe, Aug. 5, 2007, at D1, D3 (describing reaction of conservative think tank the Manhattan Institute and describing Putnam’s “inconvenient truth”).
But see Brief of Dr. Robert D. Putnam as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 11,
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., No. 11-345 (Aug. 13, 2012) (claiming long-term benefits of diversity not captured by his recent data).
7
See infra note 159.
8
See Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the Social Capital Response, 56 Clev. St. L. Rev. 271, 280 (2008) [hereinafter Brescia, Capital]
(citing Putnam’s work on racial and ethnic diversity and stating that “[i]n more heterogeneous communities, social capital is harder to develop”); Robert C. Ellickson, The False Prom-
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Curiously, in the handwringing about the harms to social capital from
diversity, no one questioned whether the problem was social capital itself. From a property scholar’s perspective, one plausible interpretation
of the correlation between high social capital and low diversity is that
high social capital reduces the costs of excluding minorities (that is, the
non-dominant race in a community) and maintaining racial homogeneity.9 Holding preferences for racial homogeneity constant and positive,
there may be reverse causation: high social capital, in the form of close
social networks and strong tastes for organizational participation and
voluntary action, may facilitate community organizing to exclude by
race or class through both informal and legal mechanisms.10 The motivation for exclusion may be preferences for homogeneity, increased property values from exclusionary land use policies, or in predominantly minority, lower-income areas, concerns that white gentrification will make
housing unaffordable. Conversely, low social capital may make it difficult for residents to organize to exclude and may result in greater racial
fractionalization.
The point of this discussion is not to establish a definitive, exclusive,
or even likely explanation for the finding of a negative correlation between diversity and social capital. There are multiple possible explanations and potential omitted variables in that research and any causal role

ise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 983, 1014–15 (2010) [hereinafter Ellickson, Mixed-Income Housing]; Nicole Stelle Garnett, The People Paradox, 2012 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 43, 43–52 (2012); James A. Kushner, Urban Neighborhood Regeneration and the
Phases of Community Evolution after World War II in the United States, 41 Ind. L. Rev.
575, 600 (2008) (noting that “the politically correct rhetoric that we celebrate diversity fails
to reflect the Nation’s beliefs”); Florence Wagman Roisman, Living Together: Ending Racial Discrimination and Segregation in Housing, 41 Ind. L. Rev. 507, 519 (2008) (describing
scholarly and popular reactions to Putnam’s research); Peter Schuck, In Diversity We (Sorta)
Trust, Am. Law., Dec. 2007, at 83–84 (describing Putnam’s research as “very important in
providing a firm empirical confirmation of what many close students of diversity thought we
already knew”).
9
High social capital could be randomly distributed or more likely endogenously related to
other community features, or the result of high social capital types self-selecting into communities with like-minded residents. In practice, it is likely that this effect is strongest in
predominantly white communities as middle and upper class whites generally tout high social capital scores—a fact which raises the question of an omitted variable effect. See infra
Section I.B.
10
For example, exclusionary zoning may work most effectively in communities with high
social capital that cannot only zone ex ante but hold the line against developers’ efforts to
circumvent zoning. See infra Section II.B.
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for social capital may be partial.11 Instead, the aim of this thought experiment is to illustrate how social capital can close off residential property
by reducing supply or constraining who may access the supply. Rather
than worrying about diversity’s harms to social capital, perhaps we
should be concerned about social capital’s harms to diversity—and to
residential property.
Social capital is an influential theory of the value of participation in
organizations, social ties and networks, civic engagement and voting,
trust, and norms of reciprocity to economic and political flourishing.
Putnam analogizes social capital to more traditional forms of capital:
“Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital
refers to properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections
among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and
trustworthiness that arise from them.”12 Social capital exponents claim
that social capital operates as a group-level positive externality that
promotes national and local economic growth, better health and education outcomes, and, more tautologically, collective action and democratic participation.13 While not blind to the potential ill effects and negative
externalities of social capital, Putnam and other social capitalists advance social capital as a positive public good and an indicator of community prosperity.14 Local social capital is principally a theory of social
cohesion, or bonding capital, and the capacity of residential groups to
produce public goods without the guiding hand of state or Keynesian intervention—a social science-infused theory of residential gemeinschaft.15
11

For example, low social capital in racially diverse areas, which are disproportionately
low-income, may also reflect resident discontent with economic entrapment in low-status or
non-white neighborhoods. Whites in diverse communities may express greater distrust of
blacks or other minorities because their prejudice is more salient in a diverse community,
and they may express greater distrust of other whites because of their frustration with their
living situation. Also, selection into diverse communities, which are often of lower-status
and wealth, may reflect lower ex ante social capital that limits access to information about
housing opportunities and reduces capacity to handle the stresses of relocation.
12
See Putnam, supra note 2, at 19.
13
See id. at 289–90.
14
See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action 36 (1990); The Saguaro Seminar: Civic Engagement in America, Harvard Kennedy School, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/saguaro (last visited Apr. 9, 2013) (describing social capital policy initiatives, community-building, and research).
15
Unlike Putnam’s, other sociological theories of social capital focus on status and power
differences in their social capital construct and analyses. See, e.g., James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory 300–18 (1990). Pierre Bourdieu, an earlier theorist, conceptualized
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In the past decade, there has been a remarkable ascendance of social
capital theory in property scholarship and law, a trend that has not been
examined to date.16 The underspecified and encompassing nature of social capital makes it simultaneously attractive to property scholars and
dangerous to theory—part of the appeal of social capital is that it is capacious enough to justify a breadth of agendas.17 Property scholars have
become enthusiastic social capitalists,18 writing about how home mortgage reform, land use law, homeownership, block-level governance,
school finance, process restrictions on eminent domain, and laws governing common interest communities can promote, or capitalize upon,
social capital.19 Social capital has also had far-ranging influence over

social capital as an individual asset generated by not only personal and group ties, but also
institutionalized relationships, impersonal networks of material or cultural exchange, and
class-based social status distinctions. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education 241, 248–49 (John G. Richardson ed., 1986).
16
Beyond property, legal articles in fields ranging from federalism to family law have
considered how law can increase social capital. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, The Social Capital
Argument for Federalism, 11 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 27, 42 (2001); Jason Mazzone, Towards
a Social Capital Theory of Law: Lessons from Collaborative Reproduction, 39 Santa Clara
L. Rev. 1, 60–75 (1998) (arguing that family law should maintain family, rather than community, social capital); Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law,
144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2055, 2063 (1996).
17
For example, William Fischel maintains that local public schools, unlike voucher
schools, enhance the flow of information and collective action by building social capital
among geographically proximate parents, while Margaret Brinig and Nicole Garnett contend
that extending voucher-based education to private Catholic schools increases social capital
and collective efficacy in areas surrounding parish schools. See Margaret F. Brinig & Nicole
Stelle Garnett, Catholic Schools, Urban Neighborhoods, and Education Reform, 85 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 887, 925–28 (2010); William A. Fischel, Why Voters Veto Vouchers: Public
Schools and Community-Specific Social Capital, 7 Econ. of Governance 109, 113–16
(2006).
18
I use the term social capitalist descriptively to refer to exponents of social capital, not to
suggest a perfect parallel with economic capitalism or capital.
19
See, e.g., Lisa T. Alexander, Hip-Hop and Housing: Revisiting Culture, Urban Space,
Power, and Law, 63 Hastings L.J. 803, 825–26 (2012); Brescia, Capital, supra note 8, at 273;
Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 Duke L.J. 75, 83–84
(1998) [hereinafter Ellickson, New Institutions]; Sheila R. Foster, The City as an Ecological
Space: Social Capital and Urban Land Use, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 527, 530–43 (2006) (exploring how local land use law affects urban social capital); Paula A. Franzese, Does It Take
a Village? Privatization, Patterns of Restrictiveness and the Demise of Community, 47 Vill.
L. Rev. 553, 588 (2002) (arguing that developer-created laws governing common interest
communities and common regulatory practices of homeowners associations chill needed social capital); Asmara Tekle Johnson, Correcting for Kelo: Social Capital Impact Assessments
and the Re-Balancing of Power Between “Desperate” Cities, Corporate Interests, and the
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property policy, with local zoning and planning for social capital, federal
Hope VI funding for low-income housing requiring social capitalenhancing design features, homeownership subsidies justified on social
capital grounds, experiments with “neighborhood direct democracy” and
block associations, and World Bank development policy to build social
capital.20 Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom has been an influential proponent of the importance of social capital to avoid tragedies of the
commons and enable successful community governance of natural resources.21
There are two threads to the theoretical account of social capital in the
property scholarship. First, property law should promote social capital in
residential communities on the theory that robust social capital benefits
local institutions and residents, and, in some accounts, spills over to advantage national democracy and economic growth. Property law can affirmatively build social capital by promoting interpersonal interaction,
mutual reliance, or residential stability—at which point law should recede.22 In some accounts, the omission or downscaling of formal law encourages cooperation and lessens the risk that ham-handed laws will suffocate the delicate shoots of growing social capital.23 Second, and
somewhat circularly, social capital fuels successful property institutions
and enables devolution of governance and public and private goods provision to resident groups.24 The unifying strand of these narratives is that
social capital, properly nourished, produces positive externalities in an
acceptably, if not perfectly, egalitarian manner and decreases the need
for legal institutions. Following Putnam, property scholars take a func-

Average Joe, 16 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 187, 191 (2006) (proposing a Social Capital Impact Assessment prior to a taking).
20
See Matthew F. Filner, The Limits of Participatory Empowerment: Assessing the Minneapolis Neighborhood Revitalization Program, 38 St. & Loc. Gov’t Rev. 67, 67–70 (2006).
See generally infra Section I.A.
21
See Elinor Ostrom, Social Capital: A Fad or a Fundamental Concept?, in Social Capital:
A Multifaceted Perspective 172, 173, 195–98 (Partha Dasgupta & Ismail Serageldin eds.,
2000).
22
See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes
270–72 (1994) [hereinafter Ellickson, Order] (describing how law can promote relationships
and repeat play necessary for informal social control); Franzese, supra note 19, at 591–92
(noting that social capital can relieve formal institutions of burdens best left to informal networks).
23
See Franzese, supra note 19, at 588; Ostrom, supra note 21, at 182.
24
See Ellickson, New Institutions, supra note 19, at 83–84; Franzese, supra note 19, at
589–90.
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tionalist (and tautological) approach: social capital is present when positive effects accrue.25 Notably, there appears to be no upward bound on
the amount of social capital deemed optimal for communities. The implicit message of social capital is more is always better.
In this Article, I advance an account of the dark side of social capital
in residential property. My critique of social capital focuses on “bonding
capital” (that is, strong social ties, thick trust, and shared norms within
cohesive communities) as the far more ubiquitous and theoretically central form of social capital. I employ the terms social capital and bonding
capital interchangeably throughout the paper. Social capital is an important factor effectuating, and sometimes creating, local factions with
interests contrary to the public interest and the rights of other citizens
that so concerned Madison.26 Networks, reciprocity, trust, tastes for participation, and social ties facilitate collusion to restrain residential property supply and to act on pre-existing preferences for illiberal exclusion.27 Social capital can also create or heighten such preferences as
collective action escalates individual commitments and dense, reciprocal
ties lock in bad norms and stifle dissent.
The enthusiasm for social capital has also obscured tradeoffs in the
devolution of property governance to residential groups. Governing
through social capital by resident groups can deliver cost-savings and
benefits of local knowledge, but it may also directly empower factions,
confine social exchange, and increase the demand for homogeneity.28
Devolving governance and public goods provision to residents ratchets
up the importance of cooperation in the face of inflated, and pervasive,
25

Putnam’s fourteen-item composite measure does not adequately separate the determinants of social capital from its consequences. Other definitions of social capital are also riddled with conceptual ambiguity and circularity. See, e.g., Michael Woolcock, The Place of
Social Capital in Understanding Social and Economic Outcomes, 2 Canadian J. Pol’y Res.
11, 13 (2001) (giving a circular definition of social capital as “the norms and networks that
facilitate collective action”); see also Alejandro Portes, Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology, 24 Ann. Rev. Soc. 1, 19 (1998) (stating that social capital
“leads to positive outcomes, such as economic development and less crime, and its existence
is inferred from the same outcomes”).
26
I thank Bruce Ackerman for his helpful insights and comments on factions and social
capital.
27
See, e.g., James DeFilippis, The Myth of Social Capital in Community Development, 12
Housing Pol’y Debate 781, 792 (2001) (stating that ethnic enclaves “completely close[] off
the market, and access to the market, to anyone who is not part of the ethnic group creating
the enclave”).
28
This happens in formal institutions and organizations as well, but subject to thicker legal
constraints.
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perceptions that similar others cooperate best (at times, promoting social
capital has verged perilously close to engineering residential racial homogeneity). Social-capital mediated governance may also encourage illiberal internal distributions of property and governance roles as classand characteristic-based social status serves as a quick and dirty allocation device to reduce the overwhelming coordination costs of collective
action.29
Social capital has masked these issues in its sunny language of sociability and the promise that sufficient social capital self-corrects its own
harms to a substantial degree. An antidote to harmful private-regarding
norms and factions is to build more expansive and encompassing communities of interest and mutual obligation. Social capital claims this solution in the form of “bridging ties” across social and geographic divides
which ostensibly inculcate public-regarding orientations and tolerance of
diversity (and if this does not occur it is because more social capital
must be fostered).30 Yet, we know little about how to build bridging ties
in a way that will prevent or mitigate negative externalities from local
social capital. And there is no evidence that diffusely constructed social
capital, if achieved, will reliably trump tighter-knit bonding social capital, or that bridging ties will not morph into bonding capital.
A question remains: are the problems I describe due to social capital
or bad norms? The answer is both. The ill effects of social capital derive
most frequently from its instrumental capacity to effectuate bad norms
and socially harmful motivations. In the residential context, Americans’
excessive, undiversified investment in homeownership does not reliably
inculcate extra-local civic virtue, and the norms attached to residential
property imperfectly and inconsistently address broader social obligations and public citizenship.31 Social capital can also produce bad norms
in two ways. First, it can create socially harmful preferences through the
process of cooperating in repeated, often ideologically binding interactions (the very promise of social capital).32 There is a wealth of evidence
that forming or strengthening “in-groups” creates in-group favoritism,

29

These points may underlie Carol Rose’s critiques of non-egalitarianism in Ostrom’s
commons. See Carol M. Rose, Ostrom and the Lawyers: The Impact of Governing the
Commons on the American Legal Academy, 5 Int’l J. Commons 28, 44 (2011).
30
See Putnam, supra note 2, at 22–24 (discussing bridging ties).
31
See William Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis 10–20 (2001).
32
Another harm is from “downward leveling norms” in poor but solidaristic communities
that impede individual economic advancement. See, e.g., Portes, supra note 25, at 17.
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biases beliefs in favor of the group’s interests, and yields more extreme
group action.33 Second, in my view, social capital reifies self-interested
activity at the expense of broader public-regarding conceptions of the
local resident-citizen role. Extra-local social obligations are less pressing, and the tradeoffs between group benefits and public harms less
troubling, because local working-together yields national dividends.
In developed market economies with established legal institutions, relying on social capital to regulate residential property or sustain community-governed property institutions with thin legal frameworks may be a
second-best solution. Rather than diminish the role of formal law, abundant social capital may increase the need for legal safeguards and, in
some cases, the desirability of formal institutions. This is not to dismiss
the work of Elinor Ostrom or Bob Ellickson, but rather to suggest that
devolution from formal law and institutions to self-governing groups requires a fuller accounting of social capital’s costs to residential life,
property supply, and liberalism. Implicit in my account is also a skeptical assessment of the claimed benefits of cohesive social capital to residential communities. After almost three decades of research, we know
little about how to promote or extract positive social capital through
property law or residential configurations—many attempts at social
capital engineering have been fumbling and ill-fated.34 There is a sense,
undoubtedly correct, that social ties, informal cooperation, and altruism
within parent groups, congregations, and other groups can have social
value. However, it is a leap from these voluntary, organic examples of
social capital—often subject to thicker constraints or occurring in areas
where government non-involvement is pivotal to social or personal identity—to relying on social capital to devolve property governance or
structure property law. Indeed, the recent enthusiasm for social capitalbuilding and informal micro-governance may be a step backward to
closed and private-minded societies—what Ferdinand Tönnies described

33

See, e.g., Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance 261–62 (1957); Irving L.
Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes 10–13 (1972); Cass R. Sunstein, Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide
42–44 (2009).
34
See infra Section I.B. Other examples include urban renewal intended to create more
socially healthy neighborhoods and mixed-use zoning to build social capital that instead appears to increase crime. See Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105
Am. J. Soc. 603, 603–11 (1999).
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as gemeinschaft—that limit social exchange and sacrifice social progress
and innovation for insularity.35
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the rise of social
capital theory in residential property law and considers the empirical
case for social capital. Part II examines the dark side of residential social
capital and the role of social capital in racial and economic segregation
and land cartels. Part III argues that devolution to resident groups, or
governing by social capital, can empower factions and increase the demand for residential homogeneity. To make my analysis more concrete,
I assess proposals for neighborhood direct democracy programs, blocklevel associations, and legal reform of common interest communities. In
Part IV, I conclude that residential norms and roles offer weak constraints against social capital’s negative externalities. Part V considers
the role of law with respect to social capital, offers preliminary thoughts
on disaggregating social capital and the utility of its component parts,
and addresses potential objections to my account. Because my analysis
of the dark side of social capital follows from the underspecified construct of social capital, it is, inescapably, coarse-grained. If social capital, and correspondingly my account of its negative externalities, ultimately proves too vague or tautological, then perhaps we need to
abandon social capital in property discourse.
I. THE SOCIAL CAPITAL REVOLUTION IN PROPERTY LAW
With his evocatively titled book Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam catapulted the theory of social capital to international fame. Social capital is
the most recent iteration in a recurrent intellectual history of theories of
solidaristic residential community—and laments of community lost.36
Putnam lauds diverse “bridging social capital,” yet his work, and its uptake in the social science and legal literature, focuses on dense and insular “bonding capital” and its positive, causal role in local and national
outcomes.37 The major measurement tools for social capital emphasize
35

See Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Civil Society 30, 48 (Jose Harris ed., 2001).
See Robert J. Sampson, Great American City 44–45 (2011) (describing social capital as
part of a longstanding intellectual history of theories of community lost and an “ideology of
lament” that has impeded serious sociological inquiry).
37
See Putnam, supra note 2, at 21–22; Citizendium Citizen Compendium, The Social Capital Foundation, http://www.socialcapital-foundation.org/TSCF/aboutus_citizendium.htm
(last visited Apr. 9, 2013) (stating social capital is the “semantic equivalent to the spirit of
community”); see also Robert D. Putnam, The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and
36
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tight-knittedness, social interaction, and participation of the type that often occurs in cohesive groups and communities.38 The generation and
deployment of social capital lends itself to face-to-face interaction and
organization at the local and sub-local level, where many theorists claim
social capital plays its strongest role.39 Accordingly, my critique of social capital focuses on bonding capital. Bridging social capital is not
immune from misuse (certain wars and political movements come to
mind). However, on balance, bridging ties appear a less potent contributor to residential social ills and have some potential to reduce illiberal
exclusion and anomie—points I return to in Part V.
The modern-day resonance of social capital has deep roots in nineteenth- and twentieth-century thought. Ferdinand Tönnies’ 1887 theory
of gemeinschaft elaborated the defining features of tight-knit, ideologically homogenous communities characterized by “natural will” and regulated informally by social bonds (gemeinschaft), and compared them to
atomistic, diverse “associations” governed by rules and regulated competition (gesellschaft).40 Emile Durkheim’s writing traced the evolution
of societies from mechanistic, in-group solidarity to organic solidarity
focused on the rights of individuals.41 Almost a century later, the Solidarity movement in Poland, rooted in a trade union that advocated
sweeping social reform, declared the primacy of communal social relations in opposition to both state and market.42 Early discourse on social
capital and community in America pursued similar themes of cohesiveness and engagement within local civil society. In 1835, de Tocqueville,
now termed the “patron saint of contemporary social capitalists,” posited
Public Life, 13 Am. Prospect 35, 36 (1993) (“Working together is easier in a community
blessed with a substantial stock of social capital.”).
38
Over three-quarters of the items in Putnam’s fourteen-item index capture, at least in
part, local social cohesion. See Tristan Claridge, Measurement of Social Capital, Social Capital Research (Jan. 5, 2004), http://www.socialcapitalresearch.com/literature/operational
isation/measurement.html. Alternative measures from other researchers and the World Bank
similarly emphasize the context of the local community. See id.
39
See infra Section I.A.
40
Although Tönnies argued that gemeinschaft was the “childhood of humanity” and gesellschaft its maturity, this point has been largely overlooked in the subsequent incorporation
of gemeinschaft into communitarian movements. See Steven Brint, Gemeinschaft Revisited:
A Critique and Reconstruction of the Community Concept, 19 Soc. Theory 1, 2 (2001).
41
See generally Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (1893).
42
See Brint, supra note 40, at 1. In recent years, the European Union has made social cohesion a goal, both across the EU and within residential communities. See Kath Hulse &
Wendy Stone, Social Cohesion, Social Capital and Social Exclusion, 28 Pol’y Stud. 109, 117
(2007).
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that the high level of associational activity in America fostered civil society and democracy.43 In 1916, state supervisor of rural schools L.J.
Hanifan, later influential in the Social Center Movement, introduced the
term social capital as the “goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and
social intercourse among a group of individuals and families who make
up a social unit.”44 Subsequently, the Community Studies Movement of
the mid-twentieth century expanded on this conception of cohesion in
residential communities and explored how participation and collective
symbols create “place identity.”45
A. Social Capital in Property Theory and Policy
In the past decade, social capital has ascended in property theory as
an aim of property law and, somewhat circularly, as a prerequisite for
successful property institutions and group self-governance.46 If the classic Lockean debate is whether property predates government (thus that
government’s purpose is to protect property), the question now is
whether social capital precedes property, or the converse. The accounts
in the property scholarship accept the validity of social capital and endorse its narrative of positive effects.47 They differ, however, in the ideological bases of their affinity for social capital and whether proposals focus in earnest on social capital, as is often the case, or instead deploy
social capital to substantiate other agendas. As in the broader discourse,
the uptake of social capital into property law has focused on bonding social capital accumulation through group cooperation and social cohesion.48 It is this sort of social cohesion, the refrain goes, that promotes

43

Putnam, supra note 2, at 292. See generally Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1945).
44
See L.J. Hanifan, The Rural School Community Center, 67 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. &
Soc. Sci. 130, 130 (1916).
45
Brint, supra note 40, at 5–6. For a classic work in the Community Studies Movement,
see W. Lloyd Warner & Paul S. Lunt, The Social Life of a Modern Community (1941).
46
See, e.g., supra notes 22–24.
47
See supra notes 8 and 19.
48
See, e.g., Ellickson, Mixed-Income Housing, supra note 8, at 1014–15; Ellickson, New
Institutions, supra note 19, at 83–84; Franzese, supra note 19, at 588 (common interest communities); Ostrom, supra note 21, at 176 (defining social capital in her analysis of property
self-governance systems as “the shared knowledge, understandings, norms, rules, and expectations about patterns of interaction that groups of individuals bring to a recurrent activity”).
Many accounts in sociology and political science also treat social capital as a theory of
community. See, e.g., Brint, supra note 40, at 7 (“[S]ocial capital . . . emphasizes the inter-
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effective property governance, non-state resolution of collective action
problems, and voluntary production of local goods.49 Sometimes there is
a Mayberry retrospective flavor to these accounts where individuals,
powered by social capital, not only produce positive externalities for
communities but also lead more psychologically fulfilling lives.50
Proposals abound for how to promote social capital through property
law, with scholars variously positing roles for land use law, mixed-use
zoning, social capital impact assessments of proposed land use changes
or eminent domain, homeownership subsidies, foreclosure relief, and
block-level residential associations.51 For example, in a detailed account
of urban social capital, Sheila Foster writes about the role of land use
law and shared urban commons in creating social capital.52 Anna di Robilant’s recent examination of common ownership claims an important
role for property rights in community gardens in fostering social capital.53 At times it appears that property determinism is at play with outsized faith in the role of property configurations, such as New Urbanist
communities or homeownership zones, to produce social capital.54 Often
these accounts envision that once law has fostered a sufficient stock of
social capital, legal institutions will take a backseat to efficient (and social capital-enhancing) group cooperation and private ordering.55 Work
such as Paula Franzese’s proposals for reforming common interest
communities and Bob Ellickson’s scholarship contend that over-

mixing of social relations and instrumental benefits, though it is closer to the community
concept in focusing on the motives underlying social relations . . . .”).
49
See Ellickson, Mixed-Income Housing, supra note 8, at 1009; Franzese, supra note 19,
at 560–62; Ostrom, supra note 21, at 173, 198–99.
50
See, e.g., Anna di Robilant, Common Ownership and Equality of Autonomy 60–63
(2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/anna_di_robilant/3
(describing social capital benefits of community gardens). See generally Putnam, supra note
2.
51
See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 19, at 852–64 (proposing social capital GIS mapping,
foreclosure relief protection, eminent domain, and affordable housing to protect and promote
place-based social capital); Brescia, Capital, supra note 8, at 273–74 (mortgage crisis);
Fischel, supra note 17, at 113–15 (education); Foster, supra note 19, at 530–46 (2006) (urban
community development); Franzese, supra note 19, at 588 (common interest communities).
52
See Foster, supra note 19, at 530–42.
53
See di Robilant, supra note 50, at 60 (asserting that community gardens are “crucial
triggers of what scholars call a neighborhood’s ‘social capital’”).
54
See Herbert J. Gans, People and Plans: Essays on Urban Problems and Solutions 28
(1968) (critiquing physical determinism and overreliance on the capacity of urban planning
to influence social outcomes).
55
See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
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specified, heavy-handed, or power-centralizing laws crowd out social
capital and norms.56
Scholars also seek to maintain social capital against the erosive effects of laws and policies, and to formalize the accounting of social interests alongside economic ones. Asmara Tekle Johnson and Lisa Alexander propose mandatory social capital impact assessments prior to
eminent domain or land use changes likely to damage social capital (the
latter suggests GIS mapping of community social capital scores).57 In a
similar vein, social capital justifies recent scholarly proposals for foreclosure relief and mortgage-lending reform.58 More generally, Richard
Pildes describes how law can destroy social capital by razing the physical spaces or social structures necessary for norms of cooperation and
undermining reciprocity through legal interpretations dissonant with
prevailing norms.59
Recently, legal scholars have leapt into the fray to propose legal institutions and policies to reduce the alleged social capital-deflating effects
of racial and ethnic diversity. In his recommendation for moderate approaches to diversity engineering, Peter Schuck observes, “Managing
diversity wisely while also building, or at least maintaining, social capital is among the most compelling and difficult tasks facing all societies
today.”60 Benjamin Barros proposes formal dispute resolution and increased privatization of common resources in order to preserve both social capital and heterogeneity in common interest communities and natu-

56
See Ellickson, Order, supra note 22, at 270–72 (describing how the design of laws and
legal institutions can support, or undermine, informal social control); Franzese, supra note
19, at 561–62, 589 (stating that common interest community “planning patterns and modes
of dispute resolution, with their emphasis on formalized mandates and broad enforcement
mechanisms, create cultures of distrust . . . . [F]ormal legal institutions are called upon to
accomplish what once was left (and is best left) to informal networks and social capital.”);
see also Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 829, 882–85 (examining effect of servitude and contract model on the prospects for community- and normbased resolution of conflicts).
57
See Alexander, supra note 19, at 854; Johnson, supra note 19, at 191.
58
See Alexander, supra note 19, at 861–63; Brescia, Capital, supra note 8, at 273 (contending that community organizations and other lending reforms can infuse social capital and
reduce predatory lending).
59
See Pildes, supra note 16, at 2063.
60
See Schuck, supra note 8, at 84 (describing the superiority of positive incentives rather
than coercive rules for managing diversity while building social capital).
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ral resources management.61 James Kushner endorses higher density,
mixed-use New Urbanist development to increase racial integration
while reducing its negative effects on social capital.62 Other scholars
contend that housing integration is the long-term solution to ensuring
social capital in diverse communities.63
The property scholarship posits social capital not only as an effect,
but also a cause of well-functioning property institutions. Social capital
enables devolution of property governance and public and private goods
provision from law and government to resident groups, including homeowners associations, neighborhood and block associations, and informally governed urban “commons.”64 Indeed, there appears to be little
that social capital cannot accomplish. Property scholars contend that social capital produces interstitial governance, facilitates resident selfgovernance, reduces conflicts in common interest communities, and
conserves valuable natural resources.65 Bob Ellickson is one of the leading legal writers on the importance of social capital to efficient property
institutions in small-scale residential settings. His work explores how
block-level associations foster and capitalize upon social capital, tightknit communities employ social capital to create and enforce norms, and
rental vouchers better maintain local social capital compared to mixedincome housing.66

61
See D. Benjamin Barros, Group Size, Heterogeneity, and Prosocial Behavior: Designing
Legal Structures to Facilitate Cooperation in a Diverse Society, 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y
203, 215–17 (2008).
62
See Kushner, supra note 8, at 599–601.
63
Integration advocate Florence Wagman Roisman argues that increased residential integration will mitigate the harms described by Putnam and sustain civil society over the longterm. See Roisman, supra note 8, at 519–20; see also Gerald E. Frug, The Geography of
Community, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1047, 1077 (1996).
64
See Ellickson, New Institutions, supra note 19, at 83 (describing how support from social capital and “a coterminous informal social network helps an institution [such as a blocklevel association] flourish”); Franzese, supra note 19, at 588 (discussing the importance of
social capital and how the regulation of common interest communities creates an environment where “social capital cannot be nurtured, let alone sustained, in settings of unbridled
restrictiveness”); cf. Sheila Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 57, 89–93 (2011) (arguing that high social capital may justify greater devolution to residents but often some government support is still necessary).
65
See e.g., Ellickson, Mixed-Income Housing, supra note 8, at 1009; Franzese, supra note
19, at 589–90; Kushner, supra note 8, at 600–01; Ostrom, supra note 21, at 182–84.
66
See Ellickson, Mixed-Income Housing, supra note 8, at 109–10; Ellickson, New Institutions, supra note 19, at 83–84; Ellickson, Order, supra note 22, at 270–72.
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Perhaps the most influential and ardent proponent of social capital’s
role in property institutions is Elinor Ostrom, winner of the 2009 Nobel
Prize. Ostrom’s path-breaking studies of successful communitygoverned common pool resources showed that tragedies of the commons
are not inevitable, or in game theory terms, that in prisoners’ dilemmas
people can make credible commitments to cooperate rather than defecting to inferior or last-best solutions.67 In several articles and a book,
Ostrom heralded social capital as a “fundamental concept” for collectively managed property: groups with sufficient ex ante social capital,
and with collective design rules and repeated interactions that maintain
social capital stock, can successfully self-govern property.68
Turning to the policy arena, social capital is now a staple of land use
planning, housing policy, and community and international development. Social capital has rocketed from printed page to policy in large
part due to its capacity to support a plethora of agendas, including privatization.69 The rhetorical force of social capital (its very sociability)
and its legitimation of social concerns in an era of economic policymaking drew liberals. For conservatives, social capital substitutes for government and, taken to the logical next step for some, counsels shrinking
welfare—economic distress is due substantially to low social capital and
best remedied with participation, not payment.
Social capital is a growing feature of land use planning—a trend unrecognized in the law scholarship and textbooks. Dozens of localities,
often funded by community foundations, have completed “Social Capital Assessments” to quantitatively measure their community’s social

67

See Ostrom, supra note 14, at 2–21, 26–28.
See id.; Ostrom, supra note 21, at 173 (noting that while there has been some “hoopla”
about social capital, “[i]t is important that social capital be taken seriously and not allowed to
be carried off as a fad”). She maintained that when “governments take over [communitymanaged natural resources or schools] they destroy an immense stock of social capital in
short order”—an especially troubling turn of events since, in Ostrom’s view, external or topdown processes are not effective at building social capital. Id. at 182.
69
Ostrom’s vision differs from traditional privatization models. However, the general incorporation of social capital in urban planning, land use, and property has capitalized on social capital as a justification for privatization. See Margit Mayer, The Onward Sweep of Social Capital: Causes and Consequences for Understanding Cities, Communities, and Urban
Movements, 27 Int’l J. Urb. & Regional Res. 108, 114–16 (2003). Indeed, Blair’s Fabian
pamphlet cited social capital, stating, “[T]he Third Way . . . will build its prosperity on human and social capital.” Tony Blair, The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century 20
(London Fabian Soc’y ed., 1998).
68
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capital, at an average cost of $25,000 to $50,000.70 Comprehensive zoning plans describe the community “stock” of social capital and report on
how to enhance social capital through zoning, support for community
groups and organizations, and growth controls.71 For example, the comprehensive plan of the city of Ludington, Michigan states that, “[e]vents
and community groups are an excellent indicator of a community’s social capital,” while the Winston-Salem Comprehensive Plan “social capital recommendations” aim to “develop opportunities to increase community interaction” and “support community organizations involved in
their planning and development efforts.”72 Social capital has featured in
the Environmental Impact Statement process under the National Environmental Protection Act.73 In at least two cases, residents have filed objections to highway and prison construction in their communities on the
grounds of deleterious impacts to local social capital from the proposed
sitings.74 Researchers Thomas Sander and Lew Feldstein, at Harvard
University’s social capital Saguaro Seminar, are developing formal assessments that governments can employ to evaluate the social capital
impacts of proposed projects.75
70
Many of these local social capital assessments were funded by community foundations
and conducted by Putnam and his team, who used the data for their research. See Doug Easterling, Promoting Community Leadership Among Community Foundations, 3 Found. Rev.
81, 83 (2011), available at http://www.cftompkins.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Easter
ling-Promoting-CL-among-CFs-doc-2.pdf.
71
As the Forsyth County comprehensive plan declares, “Social capital is important as a
planning concept because, as Putnam argues, places that are not increasing their social capital will struggle to provide their residents with the types of economic and social opportunities that make a place a truly healthy and vibrant ‘community.’” See North Suburban Area
Plan of Forsyth County and Winston-Salem 18 (Mar. 2006), http://www.cityofws.org/
Assets/CityOfWS/Documents/Planning/Publications/AreaPlans/NSAP.pdf; see also Vision
2020 Comprehensive Plan Update City of Hamilton, Ohio 87 (Jan. 2008), http://
www.hamilton-city.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=494 (“Low-density
development leads to a loss of cohesive communities, sense of place, and social capital.”).
72
See City of Ludington, Michigan: A Comprehensive Plan 15 (May 2010),
www.ludington.mi.us/docs/2009compupdatedraft050510.pdf; see also North Suburban Area
Plan of Forsyth County and Winston-Salem, supra note 71, at 53.
73
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006).
74
See Memorandum from New Hampshire Residents to Pamela J. Chandler, Chief, Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, Social Capital Impacts of the Proposed Federal Correctional Institution in
Berlin, New Hampshire (May 5, 2006), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/saguaro/
measurement/pdfs/berlinskimpact.pdf; Thomas Sander, Environmental Impact Statements
and Their Lessons for Social Capital Analysis 4 (1999), www.hks.harvard.edu/saguaro/pdfs/
sandereisandsklessons.pdf.
75
See, e.g., Lew Feldstein & Thomas Sander, Social Capital Impact Assessment, Saguaro
Seminar: Civic Engagement in America, Harvard Univ., http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/
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In cities, as funds have dwindled following federal devolution to the
states and shrinking state disbursements to localities, communitarianstyle ventures that claim to produce social capital have proliferated (or
their publicity has increased). Community gardens, gatherings, neighborhood block grants, and other efforts to socialize city residents now
ostensibly further social capital goals in an era of shrinking city funds
for social services.76 Cities have subsidized social capital-enhancing
New Urbanist developments with tax-increment financing, seemingly
with mixed motives of promoting community sociability and responding
to developer interests.77 Social capital theory also underlies recent experiments in neighborhood self-governance. As the influence of social capital and participatory empowerment burgeoned in the 1990s, Portland devolved certain land use responsibilities to neighborhood associations,
and Los Angeles created neighborhood councils to hear land use and
zoning requests and manage small funds for neighborhood improvement.78 The most notable of these neighborhood democracy reforms is
the now-defunct Minneapolis Neighborhood Revitalization Program
(“NRP”), established by the state legislature in 1990, which devolved
local planning and fiscal funding to neighborhoods.79
Social capital has also permeated federal housing policy. The federal
government justifies homeownership subsidies, such as the home mortgage interest deduction, in part on its alleged effect of promoting social
capital in local communities.80 The Hope VI low-income housing program administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) explicitly incorporates social capital. Federal guide-

ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-programs/programs/saguaro/pdfs/measurement/
skimpactassessment.pdf (last visted Apr. 9, 2013).
76
Nonprofits, such as the Urban Affairs Association, have devoted conferences to social
capital and the social reconstruction of the city and major community foundations have made
social capital the centerpiece of their work. See DeFilippis, supra note 27, at 788 (describing
social capital investment by community foundations).
77
Greg LeRoy, TIF, Greenfields, and Sprawl: How an Incentive Created to Alleviate
Slums Has Come to Subsidize Upscale Malls and New Urbanist Developments, 2 Plan. &
Envtl. L. 3, 8–10 (2008), available at http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/
pdf/apa.pdf.
78
See Matt Leighninger, The Promise and Challenge of Neighborhood Democracy 7–8
(2008).
79
See infra Section III.A.
80
See Stephanie M. Stern, Reassessing the Citizen Virtues of Homeownership, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 890, 896–97, 903–05 (2011) (finding to the contrary that differences between
homeowners and tenants are modest).
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lines for Hope VI public housing developments emphasize New Urbanist features claimed to enhance social interaction and build social capital,
as well as to increase convenience and quality of life for residents.81
HUD, particularly under former HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros, has also advocated the social capital-related theory of “defensible space” for
low-income housing. Defensible space theory claims to reduce crime by
designing buildings to increase sense of community, neighbor interaction, and resident surveillance through features such as street-facing
windows, single-family design, and cul-de-sacs.82 In some cases, defensible space concerns have led cities to close residential streets in order to
build community social capital and reduce disorder—a stark visual of
social capital’s role in closing off property.83
B. Social Science Evidence: The Case for Social Capital
The prevailing narrative among legal scholars is that social capital
produces economic growth and other beneficial community outcomes,
promotes the productive and peaceable utilization of property, and enables self-governance structures that overcome free rider problems (the
problem of free-riding on social capital is left unresolved).84 Accounts
81
See Thomas H. Sander, Social Capital and New Urbanism: Leading a Civic Horse to
Water?, 91 Nat’l Civic Rev. 213, 215 n.11, 216 (2002) (describing connection between social capital and New Urbanism and the increasing incorporation of New Urbanist principles
into HUD low-income housing projects). See generally Principles for Inner City Neighborhood Design, A Collaboration of the Congress for New Urbanism and the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development, available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/
pdf/principles.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2013).
82
See Oscar Newman, Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design 1–15,
50, 61 (1972) (describing theory and design features); Blair Kamin, Building a Sense of Security, Chi. Trib., June 21, 1995, at 1, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/199506-21/news/9506210179_1_defensible-space-public-housing-chicago-housing-authority (describing HUD backing of defensible space theory).
83
See, e.g., Oscar Newman, Defensible Space, 93 Shelterforce 8, 8 (1997), available at
http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/93/defense.html (describing defensible space initiative in a
Dayton, Ohio neighborhood that closed off thirty-five streets and twenty-five alleys).
84
See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, The Cost of Inequality: Social Distance, Predatory Conduct, and the Financial Crisis, 66 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 641, 679 (2011) [hereinafter
Brescia, Cost] (concluding that communities with high social capital are “better off”); see
also Brescia, Capital, supra note 8, at 273 (“The relative presence or strength of social capital
can mean the difference between a well-functioning society and one that is riddled by corruption, crime, low levels of civic participation and high levels of mistrust of neighbors, civic institutions, and elected officials.”); Ellickson, Mixed-Income Housing, supra note 8, at
1008–09 (describing social capital and the importance of “bonding social capital” at the
block level); Franzese, supra note 19, at 567–69.
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vary, or are silent, on whether social capital changes preferences or
merely mobilizes pre-existing preferences—but no matter, at the end of
the day social capital does something good for communities and the nation. Before turning to my account of the dark side of residential social
capital, it is worth examining these assumptions in light of social science
evidence and theory.
In Bowling Alone, Putnam makes a series of bold claims about the
value of social capital to communities: community-level social capital
enhances local economic growth, educational outcomes, child welfare,
health, and crime control.85 However, he offers only state-level data with
limited controls.86 In Putnam’s later research on U.S. communities, these
extravagant claims are no longer present.87 Moreover, even at the state
level, researchers reanalyzing Putnam’s data with more rigorous controls
for economic inequality, percent black population, region, and timelagged variables found that the relationship between state-level social
capital scores and many outcomes lost significance altogether.88 Locally,
there is little evidence that social capital improves housing outcomes or
community development, with some research suggesting that higher social capital in a building or block may displace rather than reduce crime
or other social ills.89 The correlation of social capital with crime reduction has been established only in urban neighborhoods, using a different
construct of collective efficacy, pioneered by Robert Sampson, that fo-

85

See Putnam, supra note 2. Ben Fine notes: “Social capital offers the golden opportunity
of improving the status quo without challenging it. Everything from educational outcomes
through crime prevention to better psychological health can be improved if neighbours and
communities would only pull together and trust and interact with one another.” Ben Fine,
Theories of Social Capital: Researchers Behaving Badly 4 (2010).
86
See Putnam, supra note 2, at 415–24 (describing sources and methods used in book).
87
This finding is also subject to a measurement effect where subjects who answer questions about community participation positively are then more likely to report satisfaction and
happiness due to consistency drives and cuing.
88
See Alejandro Portes & Erik Vickstrom, Diversity, Social Capital, and Cohesion, 37
Ann. Rev. Soc. 461, 468 (2011).
89
Temkin and Rohe’s study of urban neighborhood social capital concluded that volunteering and organizational participation did not affect neighborhood stability. Kenneth Temkin & William M. Rohe, Social Capital and Neighborhood Stability: An Empirical Investigation, 9 Housing Pol’y Debate 61, 84–85 (1998); see also Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce
Sacerdote, The Social Consequences of Housing, 9 J. Housing Econ. 1, 17–22 (2000); Susan
Saegert et al., Social Capital and Crime in New York City’s Low-Income Housing, 13 Housing Pol’y Debate 189, 219 (2002) (noting that while there was crime reduction in the housing
unit, crime might have been displaced to other blocks).
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cuses on norms of social regulation within communities.90 There is no
evidence that community social capital in the United States increases local economic growth, and the evidence of positive effects on health is
inconsistent.91 Most concerning, recent research by Alejandro Portes and
Erik Vickstrom calls into question the validity of Putnam’s social capital
measure and raises a serious question of whether social capital scores
reflect an omitted variable. Portes and Vickstrom find that historical patterns of slavery and Scandinavian immigration offer a better explanation
for social capital scores—a pattern they note cannot be undone by “exhorting citizens to become more participatory.”92
Research in political science, economics, and psychology suggests
other stumbling blocks for social capital. First, as J. Eric Oliver observes, it is too simplistic to assume that more social or civic participation equals more democracy or other benefits because these outcomes
depend on structural and political factors.93 One of those factors, as Morris Fiorina notes in his critique of social capital, is whether the civically
engaged group or groups represents the interests and values of the community or of larger society.94 He argues that communities may be better
off with little civic engagement or robust engagement by multiple interest groups, but that the middle ground of civic engagement often represents capture by insular minority interests.95 In addition, gains to certain
aspects of social capital often come at the expense of other aspects of
social capital or other values. In Democracy in Suburbia, Oliver argues
that suburbanization has partially demobilized citizens from local politics.96 Class and background homogeneity in the suburbs lessens political and social conflict and reduces the need for political engagement, a

90
See Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Neighborhood
Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence, 39 Criminology 517, 518 (2001).
91
See DeFilippis, supra note 27, at 798 (criticizing social capital for failing to create economic development); Megan Perry et al., Social Capital and Health Care Experiences
Among Low-Income Individuals, 98 Am. J. Pub. Health 330, 330–35 (2008) (reporting
mixed findings).
92
Portes & Vickstrom, supra note 88, at 468–69.
93
See J. Eric Oliver, Democracy in Suburbia 190 (2001).
94
See Morris P. Fiorina, Extreme Voices: A Dark Side of Civic Engagement, in Civic Engagement in American Democracy 395, 403 (Theda Skocpol & Morris P. Fiorina eds.,
1999).
95
See id. at 418.
96
See Oliver, supra note 93, at 188.
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harm which in his view outweighs the benefits of small community size
to social capital.97
Second, economic theory suggests some limitations to social capital.
Free-riding and displacement limit the amount of welfare enhancement
from social capital, while the availability of substitutes for social capital
undermines its claimed primacy to modern life. In their economic critique of social capital, Steven Durlauf and Marcel Fafchamps describe
these impediments.98 Displacement occurs when social capital redistributes a fixed supply of goods rather than creates wealth.99 For example, if
a local budget is limited and fixed, neighborhood social capital that enables a neighborhood to organize to demand better trash pick-up services
may result in reductions in the quality and promptness of trash pick-up
in other neighborhoods. In some cases, redistribution can be desirable
for equitable or historical reasons, but in other cases, it may be socially
undesirable or reflect rent-seeking. Free-riding on social capital can also
limit the incentives for its production and its net efficacy to society.100
Sheila Foster describes this problem in her discussion of free-riding as
an impediment to resident collective action in the urban commons.101
Perhaps most importantly, the availability of substitutes calls into question the necessity of abundant social capital. Communities with lower
social capital can adopt alternatives such as taxation, private provision
of goods (for example, hiring private security or other services), local
government institutions, laws, and non-profit organizations to achieve
the outcomes ascribed to social capital.102
Last, drawing on psychology research, I contend that in some instances social capital may create second-order effects where the process of
collective action, which may be socially positive in the first instance,
subsequently creates negative norms and behaviors. Indeed, some of
what we perceive as collective action “failure” may occur, and legal and
market substitutes may arise, because of the risk of negative spillovers
from the social capital and in-group formation necessary to support informal collective action. The local social capital described by Putnam
97

See id.
See Steven N. Durlauf & Marcel Fafchamps, Social Capital 16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 10485, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w10485.pdf.
99
See id. at 15.
100
See id. at 24.
101
See Foster, supra note 64, at 71–72.
102
See Durlauf & Fafchamps, supra note 98, at 11, 13.
98
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tracks the social psychological concept of self-preferencing in-groups.
In-groups are an inevitable facet of social life, but strengthening ingroups, empowering them with decision-making authority over interests
beyond the group, and failing to supply laws or norms to constrain their
actions can have substantial negative effects. In-groups typically preference the interests of their group and adopt beliefs that support their
group and further its social position.103 In doing so, members of ingroups, particularly tight-knit or high-status groups, frequently develop
negative views of or behaviors toward members of other groups.104
Work by Irving Janis on “group think” shows how intense in-group
pressures contract independent moral judgment and dissenting action.105
There is also a large body of evidence, considered by Cass Sunstein in
the legal scholarship, on how deliberating (here collectively cooperating) groups go to extremes.106 The psychological tendency to reduce dissonance between beliefs and actions by changing beliefs to support behavior provides another explanation for intensification of belief through
the process of collective action.107 The fact that people have multiple ingroup affiliations may mitigate these harms but does not eliminate them,
particularly when a person identifies strongly with one or a small number of in-groups.108
In conclusion, the strong form of social capital—Putnam’s expansive
social capital measure and exuberant outcomes claims—has limited
utility. It is under-specified, near limitless, the outcomes evidence is
weak, and recent reanalysis suggests that social capital scores reflect
omitted variables and historical determinants.109 To the extent that legal
commentators mean to adopt Putnam’s capacious social capital construct
as scientifically established and credit its array of claimed outcomes,
their case is weak for the reasons described above. However, much of
the legal literature contemplates a more modest iteration of social capital, upon which this Article focuses: the concerted effect of social net103
See Miles Hewstone et al., Intergroup Bias, 53 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 575, 576 (2002) (reviewing literature on in-group bias).
104
See id. at 585.
105
See Janis, supra note 33, at 10–13, 197–98.
106
See Sunstein, supra note 33, at 5–7, 14–16, 36–37, 41–42.
107
See Festinger, supra note 33, at 12–24, 261–62.
108
See Hewstone et al., supra note 103, at 591–93.
109
See Portes & Vickstrom, supra note 88, at 470–77; Joel Sobel, Can We Trust Social
Capital?, 40 J. Econ. Literature 139, 140 (2002) (writing that Putnam “comes close to equating social capital with good outcomes”). See generally Section I.B.
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works, in-group trust, and tastes for participation on collective action
within moderately connected or tight-knit groups.110 While not eliminating capaciousness and tautology, this construct does at least capture an
intuitive aspect of social life and one that is supported in several respects
by social psychology research.111 We need not dismiss this iteration of
social capital, but we should be skeptical of its ability to sustain property
institutions and wary of its potential harms.
II. THE DARK SIDE OF RESIDENTIAL SOCIAL CAPITAL
The enthusiasm for social capital in property law has obscured social
capital’s capacity to effectuate illiberal exclusion and create and advance
factions contrary to the public interest. Notably, social capital is at the
heart of Madison’s factions, citizen groups that advance interests contrary to the public good, described in Federalist 10, as well as factions’
economic cousins, cartels.112 Madison defined factions as “a number of
citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who
are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”113 In a similar vein, Adam Smith
observed in The Wealth of Nations that networks and trust can create
monopolization and a group whose “interest is . . . directly opposite to
that of the great body of the people.”114 Madison perceived factions in
the political sense of dominant interest group capture of the political
process and thus was less concerned with minority factions (wrongly, as

110

See, e.g., supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Janis, supra note 33, at 199–201. Notably, informal and quasi-formal forms of
social interaction and participation, often occurring in small groups and private interactions,
may have powerful effects not studied or successfully captured by the quantitative research
described in this Section.
112
See The Federalist No. 10, at 56 (James Madison) (Bantam Dell 2003). But see Peter
H. Schuck, The Limits of Law: Essays on Democratic Governance 218–22 (2000) (contending that factions are essential to a vibrant polity and that the power of diffuse interests, different forms of political resources, and the political system’s increasing resistance to factional domination reduce the magnitude of danger from factions).
113
See The Federalist No. 10, supra note 112, at 51. This definition focuses on negative
outcomes, as well as negative intentions, and therefore parallels the tendencies toward tautology in the social capital construct.
114
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 307 (Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (1776).
111
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scholars of interest group politics have pointed out).115 As the residential
context illustrates, factions operate through informal action and coordination as well as political lobbying, and both minority and majority factions can cause harm.
In considering solutions to the problem of factions, Madison observed
that “[l]iberty is to faction, what air is to fire.”116 In this instance, Robert
Putnam and the social capitalists may have the better of Madison. It is
not liberty but networks and participation that incite and explode the
power of factions, which are, at least at the outset, informal groups with
all of the collective action barriers that face self-organizing groups. Recall the constituent elements of social capital: cohesive groups and networks, reciprocity, tastes for participation, civic engagement, and trust.
Social ties spread information necessary for planning concerted action,
reinforce dominant norms, and, coupled with reciprocity, recruit participants who might otherwise object. Madison himself described what we
now refer to as diffusion in local social networks: the problem of passions spreading to create a majority faction.117 Trust, a central element of
social capital, may be particularly important when the action contemplated is collusive, illegal, or otherwise socially objectionable.118 Group
members must trust others in the relevant community not to defect or report them to authorities. Tastes for participation predict greater inclination and competence at organizing collective action. And social cohesion
and group identity provide powerful in-kind benefits that counteract the
costs of collective action.119
In residential communities, collective activity by resident factions and
cartels to constrain housing supply or entrance is facilitated by the same
cohesive networks, tastes for participation, experience with organiza-

115
See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 726–27,
742, 745 (1985).
116
The Federalist No. 10, supra note 112, at 51.
117
Cf. id. at 57–58 (stating that a large republic will prevent factions’ passions from
spreading to become a majority). Madison also argued that it is easier for small numbers of
individuals to work together. Id. at 54–55, 57.
118
As Margaret Levi observes, “[Neighborhoods] promote trust of those you know and
distrust of those you do not, those not in the neighborhood or outside the networks.” Margaret Levi, Social and Unsocial Capital: A Review Essay of Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work, 24 Pol. & Soc’y 45, 51 (1996).
119
See Roger Waldinger, The ‘Other Side’ of Embeddedness: A Case-Study of the Interplay of Economy and Ethnicity, 18 Ethnic & Racial Stud. 555, 557 (1995).
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tions, and in-group trust attributed to positive social capital.120 Indeed,
bonding social capital, with its elements of group cohesion and insularity, reciprocity, and collective engagement, is perhaps uniquely wellsuited to producing exclusion—likely more so than democracy or other
claimed benefits. This may explain why social capital features so prominently in Ostrom’s research on open-access natural resource commons
where preserving the resource often necessitates exclusion of entrants or
uses.121 In the residential context, there is a robust correlation between
high social capital and racial exclusion, though the studies to date do not
establish causation.122 Qualitative studies of bonding capital, often in the
context of ethnic control of industries, also provide some empirical support for the tendency of cohesive social capital to confer gains to ingroups at the expense of closing markets.123 In general, the evidence for
social capital’s role in factions and exclusion is difficult to assess quantitatively through standard outcomes measures: If high social capital produces collusive behavior, it may improve some local and state indicators, but impose harms on society and the national economy that are
difficult to link causally.
In addition to its capacity to effectuate factions, social capital may also create or intensify factions by bonding together groups that then
adopt group-preferencing beliefs and agendas. The type of collective action envisioned by social capitalists—intensive, reiterative, and in pursuit of a common goal—may intensify preferences by escalating group
identity and in-group dynamics and increasing the cost of dissent. As
previously discussed, a large body of evidence in social psychology
supports these effects: Research illustrates the vulnerability of groups to
“group think,” the effect of dense social networks on conformity, and
the tendency toward cognitive dissonance where people change beliefs
to make them consonant with their actions.124 Moreover, some research
suggests that group bias tracks social position and may create a greater
propensity for these effects among high-status groups.125
120

Group collusion to restrain supply is problematic when the property in question has
demand beyond the group and its restraint is socially harmful, or when the internal distribution of property is inegalitarian.
121
See, e.g., Ostrom, supra note 21, at 173–79, 182–84.
122
See supra text accompanying notes 9–10.
123
See Portes, supra note 25, at 15.
124
See Festinger, supra note 33, at 12–24; Janis, supra note 33, at 10–13, 197.
125
High-status groups, or factions, tend to show more bias apart from any effect of wealth
or resources, and there is some evidence to suggest that this effect is more pronounced when
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Endeavoring to raise social capital in a town, neighborhood, or block
is more likely to coalesce or strengthen factional subgroups than to further the interests of the broader residential or social collective. The cost
of creating and maintaining social capital is lower in small and homogenous groups, all else constant. As a result, social capital disproportionately advances factions, which tend to be discrete and homogenous
groups, compared to large groups and more diverse communities of interest. The strong interests entailed in factions also dovetail with social
capital. Because social capital accumulation requires significant investment and effort by group members, it is most likely to effectuate collective action where participants have strong motivations and will capture a
high proportion of the benefits, as is often the case with bad acts as well
as private goods. In addition, in developed economies, social networks
and informal institutions may be most effective at providing goods that
cannot be supplied at a low-cost or at all from the market or government.
It is possible that social capital’s dark side is so substantial in part because legal and market substitutes are comparatively less available for
bad acts, illiberalism, and illegal activity (though not unavailable as evidenced by laws such as exclusionary zoning and racially restrictive covenants).
Madison was convinced one could not control the causes of factions.
In theory, however, reducing the social capital in an area or group can
address the mediator of public bads from factions (social capital partially
mediates the relationship between “passions” and faction effects). Perhaps Madison’s views of the protective power of diverse interests and
the increased costs of organizing factions in large republics track the
idea of breaking up social capital. However, Madison neglected substitutes for social capital. Factions in small geographic areas, such as
neighborhoods or small towns, which have the advantage of close proximity and social ties, may employ social capital, whereas factions at a
larger scale often rely more heavily on the substitutes of economic and
political capital. This lends support to Carol Rose’s vigorous refutation
of Madison’s arguments about the particular susceptibility of local governments to faction.126 It also suggests a partial explanation for Madithe groups perceive their status differential narrowing or a threat to group status. See Hewstone et al., supra note 103, at 585.
126
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 Yale L.J. 1121, 1132–34
(1996) (reviewing William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics
(1995)).
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son’s concern about factions in small geographic areas, as well as the tenacious modern-day suspicion of local government corruption. Perhaps,
as intrinsically social beings, social capital-fueled actions at the local
level are not more potent but rather more salient, evocative, and squarely
within our experience, than political lobbying, trade associations, and
other substitutes that make factions effective at larger scales. Indeed, it
may be that Madison suffered from availability bias.
Concededly, the relationship between social capital and factions is
imprecise, and the dark side of social capital is no more delimited than
its positive aspect. Social capital does not create a particular interest, in
the way we typically conceive of factions. I employ factions as a conceptual umbrella, rather than a perfect analog, for the negative externalities of social capital. The dark side of social capital and its role in factions also suffers unavoidably from the same capaciousness and
tendency toward tautology that plagues the social capital construct.127 I
do not resist these critiques or their implications. My contention is that,
taking the social capital construct as I find it, local social capital elicits
both socially positive collective action and factional collective action
desirable and sometimes efficient within the group, but harmful to the
broader community. If social capital ultimately proves too encompassing
to usefully describe positive or negative local effects, then it should be
abandoned in property discourse.
Property scholars have been neglectful of, but not blind to, the dark
side of social capital.128 The property scholarship notes in passing negative uses of social capital, but does not address the magnitude or implications of social capital’s dark side.129 Scholars have, however, raised
related concerns about illiberalism in commons situations. Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller focus on constraints on exit and voice as threats

127

Of course, there are some limits to my account and the social capital construct, such as
situations where distrust or a lack of civic orientation within the group fuels its collective
action.
128
Outside of property law, Frank Cross endorses the value of the trust component of social capital to transactional law, but recognizes the dark side of trust and notes the problems
of ethnic control of trade and discrimination from strong affective trust. See Frank B. Cross,
Law and Trust, 93 Geo. L.J. 1457, 1532–43 (2005).
129
See Franzese, supra note 19, at 568; cf. Foster, supra note 19, at 563 (exploring social
capital’s benefits for urban communities but observing that “the goal of providing ‘bridging’
capital may be undermined by social prejudices and the exclusionary effects of social networks in racially and economically homogenous neighborhoods”).
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to a liberal commons.130 Carol Rose argues for at least a minimal framework of law to address concerns of hierarchical, non-egalitarian, and
sexist practices in Ostrom’s commons.131 Other perspectives embrace
markets and implicitly minimize the role of self-governance, such as
work by Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith on information costs and
standardized property forms.132
In the social science literature, amid droves of papers lauding social
capital, a smaller number have explored social capital’s dark side.133 In
her work on community-managed natural resources, Ostrom acknowledges and describes the dark side of social capital but does not grapple
with whether or when this dark side should limit her proposals for selfgovernance of natural resource commons.134 Putnam readily concedes
that bonding capital can be exclusive, but claims two intrinsic safeguards. First, he contends that associational participation and civic engagement promote tolerance, and notes that social capital scores positively correlate with tolerance.135 In addition to the reliability issues with
self-report, the fact that individuals living in segregated communities
and likely participating in homogenous groups and organizations report
more tolerance may prove little. At the state level, if, as Portes and
Vickstrom maintain, low state social capital scores reflect historic patterns of slavery, it is not surprising that more tolerant states report higher
social capital.136 Second, Putnam maintains that bridging ties constrain

130
Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 Yale L.J. 549, 567–
68, 590–91 (2001).
131
See Rose, supra note 29, at 33, 44.
132
See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 8–9 (2000).
133
See Jan W. van Deth & Sonja Zmerli, Introduction: Civicness, Equality, and Democracy—A “Dark Side” of Social Capital?, 53 Am. Behav. Scientist 631, 632–38 (2010) (reviewing social science literature on dark sides of social capital and introducing contributions to a
recent symposium on social capital’s detrimental political effects); see also Fine, supra note
85, at 5 (noting that among social scientists the critics of social capital are “heavily outweighed”). The social science accounts of social capital’s dark side often focus on extreme
examples of mafia activity, gangs, genocidal atrocities, and insular, religious solidarity. See
Levi, supra note 118, at 52 (describing how the mafia uses bridging ties within vertical relationships for organized crime); Portes, supra note 25, at 18 (describing how negative social
capital, or embeddedness in social structures, fuels “[m]afia families, prostitution and gambling rings, and youth gangs”); Putnam, supra note 2, at 21–22 (describing how negative social capital enabled the Timothy McVeigh bombing, urban gangs, and the Ku Klux Klan).
134
See, e.g., Ostrom, supra note 21, at 176–77.
135
Putnam, supra note 2, at 355–56.
136
See Portes & Vickstrom, supra note 88, at 467–69.

2013]

The Dark Side of Town

841

illiberal effects by connecting geographically and socially distant individuals, facilitating diffusion of information and ideas, and generating
broader identities.137 Yet, we have had difficulty engineering the types of
bridging ties that trump bonding capital, promote inclusion and tolerance, connect disadvantaged people to opportunities, and create rather
than redistribute wealth.138 Bridging capital often has a limited radius,
necessitating a plethora of bridging ties to ensure broader solidarity (for
example, labor unions bridged across race but not income). And once
achieved, bridging ties and capital may morph into bonding capital.
While bridging capital has some value to residential property, it is
doubtful that it can fully remedy the negative externalities of local bonding capital.
My account challenges the legal scholarship’s depiction of social capital as a positive good, and augments the social science literature with a
view of the pervasive, sometimes quotidian nature of social capital’s
dark side in residential property. The enthusiasm for promoting residential social capital has not confronted the disquieting reality of seemingly
abundant negative social capital in localities—and the potential for social capital engineering, if effective, to exacerbate such harms.139 Social
capital often functions as a norm-neutral infrastructure that effectuates
motivations, which include prejudice, risk-aversion, and rent-seeking.
When the social capital that legal scholars and policymakers are attempting to build is mere cohesion, without a strong normative valence toward
public interest values, liberalism, altruism, or positive social regulation,
there is little reason to assume that such ventures will be welfareenhancing or egalitarian. This is not to claim that legal proposals or initiatives to promote social capital are solely responsible for these ills,
which derive from powerful norms and financial incentives. Rather, it is
to elucidate, in the context of anemic residential norms regarding extralocal obligations to the public good, the problem with proposals to promote social capital while diminishing the role of law.
137

See Putnam, supra note 2, at 23; Wilfred Dolfsma & Charlie Dannreuther, Subjects and
Boundaries: Contesting Social Capital-Based Policies, 37 J. Econ. Issues 405, 407–10
(2003).
138
See, e.g., Madeleine Leonard, Bonding and Bridging Social Capital: Reflections from
Belfast, 38 Soc. 927, 941 (2004).
139
But see Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1047, 1098–100
(2008) (referring to reducing investment stake risk through proposed homeownership form,
which splits consumption and use interests between different owners, might lessen both beneficial forms of “collective control” and negative forms such as exclusion).
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Interestingly, my analysis of sundown towns and exclusionary suburbs also suggests that bonding social capital can operate effectively and
negatively, if at a higher cost, beyond the scale of small groups. Bob Ellickson has argued that bonding social capital functions effectively only
in small-scale settings, such as a block or median size homeowners association.140 In his view, lawmakers should be more concerned about policing at the larger scales of neighborhoods and localities, where social
capital formation is limited.141 The case studies in this Article suggest
that while scale matters, strong interests and bridging ties can overcome
the higher transaction costs of social capital development and deployment at the scales of neighborhoods and towns. A critical mass of highly
motivated actors appears quite capable of recruiting like-minded others
through bridging ties, developing cohesive groups and intra-group
norms, and engaging in coordinated behavior that disadvantages outsiders or out-groups.
In the balance of this Part, I consider the alleged deficit of social capital and proposals to increase residential social capital through the lenses
of residential segregation and land cartels. My examples are retrospective accounts intended to illustrate social capital’s role in residential factions and exclusion, not prospective hypothesis-testing or conclusive
empirical proof. My examination of the dark side of social capital in residential property raises questions of whether law should attempt to affirmatively weaken residential social bonds, perhaps with measures such
as incentives for mobility or heavy subsidies for economic integration. I
mainly save these questions for future work. In Part V, however, I do
suggest that property institutions with greater reliance on markets and
laws, among other alternatives, may foster more inclusive forms of solidarity than property gemeinschafts and informal collectives.
A. Sundown Towns: Social Capital, Racial Segregation, and Bad Norm
Lock-In
In the early to mid-twentieth century, “sundown towns” across the
United States evicted black residents and visitors through threats, labor

140

See Robert C. Ellickson, The Puzzle of the Optimal Social Composition of Neighborhoods, in The Tiebout Model at Fifty: Essays in Public Economics in Honor of Wallace
Oates 199, 204–06 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006) [hereinafter Ellickson, Social Composition].
141
I thank Bob Ellickson for his discussion with me of his views on this point.
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market exclusion, violence, and signs advising blacks, “Don’t Let the
Sun Go Down on You in [town name].”142 These towns illustrate a larger
national phenomenon—in an era Putnam claims as rich in social capital,
white residents worked together zealously to maintain racial homogeneity. Contemporary racial segregation and urban poverty are rooted in part
in this national history of racial purging, which appears to have been effectuated through considerable social capital.143
In sundown towns, collective action was embedded in dense networks
of social ties that spread information about riots, pledges, mob violence,
and other coordinated action and channeled anti-black norms. Community cohesion helped to reward participants with social standing and
group identity—benefits in addition to any implicit compensation they
derived from racist acts. Groups of residents or business owners gathered to sign pledges not to employ blacks or to allow them to live in the
area.144 Residents converged on blacks to warn them to leave town.145
Civic engagement and political participation produced sundown ordinances and laws requiring resident approval before subsidized housing
could be built.146 Social network linkages to local realtors, bankers, grocery store and gas station owners, and town officials meant that blacks
142
See James W. Loewen, Sundown Towns: A Hidden Dimension of American Racism 3–
4, 36–37, 99–101 (2005). Loewen estimates that at least 3000 and as many as 15,000 independent towns “went sundown” between 1890 and 1930, and several thousand sundown
suburbs formed between 1900 and 1968. See id. at 79–80. Historians have critiqued Loewen’s research for its lack of attention to black agency, its erratic substantiation, and its
claims about the northern migration. See Luther James Adams, Sundown Towns: A Hidden
Dimension of American Racism, 93 J. Am. Hist. 601, 602 (2006) (book review) (praising
Loewen’s massive and well-documented study but critiquing the limited attention to the
black experience); Kenneth Joel Zogry, Sundown Towns: A Hidden Dimension of American
Racism by James W. Loewen, 29 Pub. Historian 105, 106–07 (2007) (critiquing inadequate
fact documentation and lack of attention to black reactions and agency). But no historian has
disputed the fact of sundown towns. Zogry, supra, at 105 (“There is no question that the
premise of Sundown Towns is correct.”).
143
Intrinsic satisfaction with racist acts no doubt also helped overcome collective actions
and convince perpetrators to pay the costs of action and face the threat, concededly not large
in most areas, of arrest or prosecution. See Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit 209–50 (1996). Some towns still flaunted sundown signs as of 1990, and today some small Southern towns display signs of black mules at
their town lines. See Loewen, supra note 142, at 380.
144
See Loewen, supra note 142, at 249; see also Ray Stannard Baker, Following the Color
Line: An Account of Negro Citizenship in the American Democracy 120, 130 (1908).
145
As the Illinois State Register recorded in 1908, “A Negro is an unwelcome visitor and
is soon informed he must not remain in the town.” Loewen, supra note 142, at 227.
146
See id. at 253.
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could be excluded not only from jobs, but also from necessities of daily
living.147 Intergenerational closure, a key aspect in some iterations of social capital, was employed by white parents to harass black children either directly or through their children.148 And bridging ties reduced the
costs of exclusion by carrying news about town reputations that deterred
black entry and spread information about the trend of local racial purging—many towns “went sundown” after residents learned about nearby
sundown towns.
Participation in community organizations, a central constituent of social capital, also facilitated racial exclusion—historically, an important
purpose of neighborhood clubs and associations was racial exclusion.149
Thomas Sugrue’s history of Detroit describes how neighborhood associations that “saw their purpose as upholding the values of selfgovernment and participatory democracy” organized to keep blacks
from moving into their neighborhoods in order to protect property values
and the “character” of their communities.150 For example, in one Detroit
West Side neighborhood, over six hundred residents held an emergency
meeting to form a neighborhood association in response to a black family moving into the area.151 The National Association of Community Associations organized “to keep the colored race from encroaching on the
rights of the property owners by buying into the neighborhood.”152 “Citizen committees” coordinated to drive out blacks and “Farmers’ Commercial Clubs” sought to replace black residents with white farmers.153
Following Shelley v. Kraemer, neighborhood and civic associations
across the country organized to flout the decision through tactics ranging
from harassment to abuse of nonconforming use ordinances.154
In addition to effectuating racial purging, solidaristic social capital
likely intensified racist preferences and locked in bad norms. Recall that
147

See id. at 234, 259–62.
See id. at 265–66.
149
For example, one of the earliest razings of a Chinese neighborhood occurred in 1885
when 150 miners and railroad workers, led by the Knights of Labor, attacked hundreds of
Chinese-American miners, drove them out of town, and then burned their homes. See id. at
50–51.
150
See Sugrue, supra note 143, at 211.
151
Id. at 214.
152
Id. at 219.
153
Loewen, supra note 142, at 84, 241–42.
154
For example, the Federated Property Owners homeowners association “called for a
citywide network” to monitor, harass, and manipulate prices. See Sugrue, supra note 143, at
221.
148
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groups tightly bound together with social capital are likely to develop
attitudes and pursue actions that preference their own group.155 For these
reasons, anti-social action may spiral over time—indeed, sundown
towns may be a vigilante version of how deliberating groups go to extremes.156 On the omission side of preference construction and escalation, cohesive social capital tends to lock in bad norms and preferences
that hinder or foreclose change. Dense ties mean that dissent would
cause friction between close-knit community members and threaten social estrangement.157 Social ties and the rapid spread of information
through local networks also enable groups to punish “defectors,” in the
case of sundown towns by retaliating against whites who hired, housed,
or befriended blacks.158
Interestingly, the most recent influence of social capital on residential
racial segregation is normative. Putnam’s highly publicized 2007 social
capital research claims (contrary to the weight of the evidence on this
question) that residential racial diversity dramatically lowers social capital.159 These claims have seeped into public discourse and beliefs. Social
capital theory also maintains, with limited evidence, that community
flourishing and economic success rely on residential behaviors that
Americans believe are intrinsically uncharacteristic of blacks and unlikely to occur in racially integrated or otherwise heterogeneous communities. Residential racial beliefs link blacks and integrated neighborhoods
155

See supra notes 103–08 and accompanying text.
See Janis, supra note 33, at 12–13; see also Sunstein, supra note 33, at 3–7.
157
Interviews and oral histories suggest that some residents disagreed with such actions (or
at least claimed to in hindsight) but did not speak up from fear of retaliation. See Loewen,
supra note 142, at 232.
158
See id. at 244, 271.
159
See Putnam, supra note 1. A line of subsequent studies using more robust controls and
sophisticated analytical techniques finds that the effect of neighborhood diversity on social
capital claimed by Putnam is small and contingent on contextual factors like inequality and
segregation. See Edward Fieldhouse & David Cutts, Does Diversity Damage Social Capital?
A Comparative Study of Neighbourhood Diversity and Social Capital in the US and Britain,
43 Canadian J. Pol. Sci. 289, 307 (2010) (“[A] very large proportion of [the effect of diversity on neighborhood norms] is attributable to [individual and neighborhood] characteristics . . . .”); Natalia Letki, Does Diversity Erode Social Cohesion? Social Capital and Race in
British Neighbourhoods, 56 Pol. Stud. 99, 118–19 (2008); Melissa J. Marschall & Dietlind
Stolle, Race and the City: Neighborhood Context and the Development of Generalized Trust,
26 Pol. Behav. 125, 142 (2004) (finding large effect of neighborhood educational attainment); see also David E. Campbell, Why We Vote: How Schools and Communities Shape
Our Civic Life 64 (2006) (finding that in communities that are looser-knit and more politically heterogeneous, there is less informal civic engagement but more political activity and
voting).
156
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to the antitheses of residential social capital: low neighboring, weak
community contribution, and disorderly behavior.160 By locating prosperity in solidarity and cooperation, social capital appears to validate the
reasons whites cite for opposing black entry: concern over community
decline and falling property values.161 It seems that the sundown signs
have been replaced by allegedly more benign and “scientific” concerns
about cooperation and collective action—delicate processes that can be
undone by heterogeneity as well as by prejudice itself.
B. Exclusionary Zoning: Social Capital and Local Land Cartels
The efforts of suburban land cartels to restrain housing supply
through monopoly zoning and exclusionary land use regulations are a
topic of great interest and consternation to property law scholars.162
These regulations include large minimum lot-sizes, zoning exclusively
for single-family housing, growth controls, and discriminatory enforcement of housing codes against rentals. There has been vigorous debate
about the “monopoly zoning hypothesis” and its effect on housing consumers.163 The weight of the evidence to date indicates that in localities
with strong monopoly power and politically powerful homeowners, exclusionary zoning reduces the rate and density of housing development
below the optimal value of the land in a competitive market.164 This arti160

See Lawrence Bobo & Camille L. Zubrinsky, Attitudes on Residential Integration: Perceived Status Differences, Mere In-Group Preference, or Racial Prejudice?, 74 Soc. Forces
883, 896 (1996); Reynolds Farley et al., Stereotypes and Segregation: Neighborhoods in the
Detroit Area, 100 Am. J. Soc. 750, 769 (1994) (finding that most whites rate blacks as more
likely to live off of welfare and less easy to get along with); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen
W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of
“Broken Windows,” 67 Soc. Psychol. Q. 319, 336–37 (2004).
161
See Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, Participation in Heterogeneous Communities,
115 Q.J. Econ. 847, 850, 886 (2000).
162
See Anthony Downs, New Visions for Metropolitan America 20 (1994). See generally
Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 Yale
L.J. 385 (1977) [hereinafter Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls].
163
It has proven challenging to parse empirically whether price increases are due to the
impact of land use regulation on improving housing and providing desirable amenities or
constricting supply (for example, monopoly). See John M. Quigley & Larry A. Rosenthal,
The Effects of Land Use Regulation on the Price of Housing: What Do We Know? What
Can We Learn?, 8 Cityscape 69, 70, 81 (2005) (describing methodological challenges).
164
See, e.g., William A. Fischel, Political Structure and Exclusionary Zoning: Are Small
Suburbs the Big Problem?, in Fiscal Decentralization and Land Policies 130 (Gregory K.
Ingram and Yu-Hung Hong eds., 2008), available at https://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/
2105_1427_LP2007-ch05-Political-Structure-and-Exclusionary-Zoning-Are-Small-Suburbs-
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ficially constricts supply and increases housing prices and segregation.
Recent evidence from the Pew Foundation shows that economic residential segregation has increased dramatically across the past three decades;
racial segregation is declining but substantial.165 We need not specify a
point of optimal economic, or racial, integration in order to conclude
that our extraordinarily high level of segregation is concerning.166
In localities across the United States, social capital helps to effectuate
land cartels through both informal and formal (legal) coordination to
maintain exclusionary zoning. High social capital entails dense networks, in-group trust, and tastes for participation that facilitate coordination and bring to light opportunities to engage in monopoly behavior.
The diamond merchants of New York and other tight-knit groups, lauded for their self-regulation without law, are also examples of how social
capital promotes oligopoly to the detriment of market efficiency.167 In
their economic critique of social capital, Durlauf and Fafchamps offer as
an example collusion to drive up prices between fishing groups from different fishing grounds, selling on the same market, who are connected
by strong bridging ties and high social capital.168 Applied to local resithe-Big-Problem.pdf [hereinafter Fischel, Small Suburbs] (concluding that monopoly zoning
occurs in fragmented metropolitan statistical areas populated with small suburbs). Research
by James Thorson found that communities with more monopoly power have higher house
prices but are not more restrictive in producing new housing. Thorson suggested that in addition to monopoly motivations, wealth effects and illegitimate exclusionary preferences may
play a role in higher housing costs. See James A. Thorson, An Examination of the Monopoly
Zoning Hypothesis, 72 Land Econ. 43, 55 (1996).
165
See Richard Fry & Paul Taylor, The Rise of Residential Segregation by Income, Pew
Research Social and Demographic Trends (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/
2012/08/01/the-rise-of-residential-segregation-by-income.
166
This is particularly true in light of the local nature of school financing and the social
and individual ill effects of concentrated poverty. See David M. Cutler & Edward L. Glaeser,
Are Ghettoes Good or Bad?, 112 Q.J. Econ. 827, 827 (1997) (concluding that blacks in segregated areas have significantly worse outcomes than blacks in integrated areas); cf. Ellickson, Social Composition, supra note 140, at 200–02 (arguing that complete integration would
reduce neighborhood diversity and foreclose options for blacks to live in mostly black
neighborhoods).
167
See Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115, 115–17 (1992); see also Portes, supra note 25,
at 13, 15 (describing ethnic control of trades and police and fire unions).
168
Durlauf & Fafchamps, supra note 98, at 31. In my view, in-group solidarity may mitigate collusion between groups by increasing insularity and decreasing inter-group contact.
However, if there are sufficient incentives and inter-group ties for cooperation, cohesive
groups reduce the transaction costs of colluding by enabling coordination between a small
number of groups rather than large numbers of individuals. In addition, structural and market
conditions may allow monopoly by a single group.
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dential markets, social capital may effectuate two forms of land cartelization. In a classic cartel, owners and suppliers of housing who wish to
limit competition from higher-density developments with smaller houses
enforce zoning and other land use regulations to create an artificial restriction on supply and force buyers to pay more for houses. Exclusionary zoning also encompasses non-classic cartels where residents are not
concerned about competition, but that smaller, higher-density housing
will draw “undesirables” who will put off prospective buyers and reduce
property values.169
Social capital may play a role in political organization to enact exclusionary zoning ordinances and growth controls.170 In an empirical analysis of growth controls, William Fischel found that small suburbs were
more likely to have strict development and growth restrictions than larger communities.171 Fischel attributes this to the fact that in larger jurisdictions, developers have more political power while homeowners have
more difficulty organizing.172 This can also be explained in social capital
terms with social cohesion mediating the effect of suburb size on exclusionary zoning: In smaller suburbs, greater social cohesion may facilitate
the spread of information, lower the costs of civic engagement, and recruit residents who have social ties to growth control supporters. Of
course, social capital is not the sole cause of exclusionary zoning or the
only possible explanation for this finding—economic incentives and
other social forces matter too.
Most fundamentally, social capital facilitates the social regulation
necessary to maintain and enforce zoning and growth controls.173 Exclusionary zoning is under frequent assault by developers seeking profits
from higher-density construction as well as from fair housing advocates

169

I thank Richard Squire for his helpful comments on classic and non-classic cartels.
Readers may question whether Putnam’s social capital—which encompasses political
organization, legislation, and informal cooperation—is overbroad. I agree with that view and
accordingly focus most of my attention on what I see as the heart of social capital: its role in
informal collective action and quasi-formal community self-governance.
171
Fischel, Small Suburbs, supra note 164, at 130 (noting that areas “whose land-use is
controlled by very few jurisdictions . . . appear to be subject to the monopoly zoning effect”).
172
Id.
173
Social capital-mediated exclusionary zoning recalls the nested institutions and polycentric regulation described in Ostrom’s work: informal collective action to discriminate and
exclude occurs within local and regional legal regimes. See Elinor Ostrom, Beyond Markets
and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems, 100 Am. Econ. Rev.
641, 641–43 (2010).
170
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and occasionally state legislatures.174 Maintaining exclusionary zoning
requires residents to organize, share information, and protest development plans, permit requests, and variance requests.175 Neighborhood residents also cooperate to informally ostracize undesirable entrants, including minorities and tenants, through mechanisms such as social
exclusion and gossip.176 High social capital enables “NIMBYism” (not
in my backyard), as Putnam has recognized, where resident factions organize committees and protests, lobby government, and in some cases
pool funds to oppose locally undesirable land uses, such as halfway
houses and environmental waste sites.177 In the case of affordable housing, one of the most fever-pitched settings for NIMBY opposition, dense
ties and a cohesive local identity can intensify and embolden residents’
opposition to the “wrong kind of people.”
Social capital theory itself may justify land use protectionism. Some
local comprehensive plans suggest that growth controls are necessary to
maintain their community’s social capital. Communities depict such efforts as “protecting our small-town character” and local stocks of social
capital.178 For example, the city of Excelsior, Minnesota’s Comprehensive Plan states, under the heading of “Social Capital Actions and Strategy,” that the city must “[i]n all City projects and private redevelopment, consider what impact there will be on small town historic
character.”179 Interestingly, the Supreme Court case upholding the constitutionality of zoning, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., may
174

See, e.g., Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian’s Market: Economics of Inclusionary
Zoning Reclaimed, 24 Fordham Urb. L.J. 23, 51, 65–68 (1996) (describing arbitrage profit
incentives for developers to seek density variance and discussing set-asides and other state
programs for affordable housing); George Lefcoe, California’s Land Planning Requirements:
The Case for Deregulation, 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 447, 485–86 (1980-81) (discussing state legislative and agency efforts to compel inclusionary zoning).
175
Local governments routinely employ zoning flexibility devices and grant variances,
which offer case-by-case relief from zoning requirements.
176
It may be that one important role of the local clubs and organizations so admired by
Putnam is to signal racial, political, or religious preferences. Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 Va. L. Rev. 437, 464–76 (2006) (describing use of amenities such as golf clubs to signal racial and other preferences). Extending
this theory from amenities to local organizations, some groups, such as the Junior League
and Elks for example, are strongly associated with whites.
177
See Putnam, supra note 2, at 21–22 (conceding that social capital can promote
NIMBYism).
178
See, e.g., City of Excelsior, 2008 Comprehensive Plan, Excelsior, Minnesota 147
(2008), www.ci.excelsior.mn.us/DocumentView.aspx?DID=277.
179
See id.
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have alluded to a social capital justification in its decision.180 The Court
described apartments as a “mere parasite” on single-family neighborhoods that zoning must control or a neighborhood’s “desirability as a
place of detached residences [will be] utterly destroyed.”181 While the
Court focused on the impact of multi-family units on open space and
amenities, the opinion’s impassioned tone, repeated references to maintaining the “residential character” of single-family neighborhoods, and
use of the term “parasite” suggest that the Court also may have been
concerned with neighborhood social fabric and cohesion.182
A remaining question is whether weak social capital channels collusion toward law, as opposed to informal action, as a lower-cost but more
global and damaging means to effectuate monopoly and entrance restraints. Perhaps communities high in social capital can more easily exclude or constrain supply informally, whereas those with modest baselines of social capital find it more efficient to enact laws. If true,
promoting social capital may be the lesser of two evils. While this is a
plausible theory and may apply to other contexts such as racial exclusion, it is not clear that it tracks patterns of suburban exclusionary zoning. Growth controls are more common in small suburbs, which likely
boast higher social capital and cohesion.183 Even if low social capital
does create incentives for harmful legislation, law retains the virtues of
greater visibility, placement in the public sphere of debate and norm
construction, and susceptibility to external challenge and revision.
III. RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY: GOVERNING THROUGH SOCIAL CAPITAL
Ostrom’s self-governing collectives have enticed residential property
and land use scholars with their merger of pro-sociality and efficiency:
Through close ties with others, people can overcome collective action
problems and manage resources wisely. Yet, is this rosy picture accurate? Can we rely on social capital’s positive effects to substitute in substantial share for legal and market institutions in residential property? In
the past thirty years, states and localities have experimented with formal
and quasi-formal neighborhood and block-level governance, piloted participatory budgeting in districts and wards, relied increasingly on resi180

272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Id. at 394.
182
See id.
183
See Fischel, Small Suburbs, supra note 164, at 130.
181
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dents to provide public goods and neighborhood services, and witnessed
the proliferation of private homeowners associations.184 Robert Nelson
has advocated for a nationwide system of neighborhood associations,
comparable to private homeowners and condominium associations, with
the power to enact regulations, control zoning and development, and
provide local services.185 Bob Ellickson and Elinor Ostrom have endorsed de-centralizing certain local governance functions to block-level
and community institutions respectively, with varying degrees of legal
formality.186 The work of property scholar Paula Franzese contemplates
downsizing aspects of common interest community law in order to enable norms-based self-governance within private homeowners associations.187
Residential “micro-institutions” offer the advantages of local
knowledge, cost-savings for local government, and, more debatably, a
greater sense of personal empowerment or sub-local stake. Yet, they also
entail problems and tradeoffs. Governing through social capital does not
reliably safeguard against—and in some circumstances can affirmatively
promote—rent-seeking, violations of individual rights, and collusion to
restrain property supply. Devolving governance power, particularly regulatory and spending power, to resident groups can directly empower
factions, whose members may be motivated to assume unpaid board positions and governance roles to advance their interests. Of course, the
risks of collusion and rent-seeking are not limited to informal governance, but endemic to a variety of institutions. However, the idealization
of governing through social capital, coupled with weaker rule of law
constraints and less transparency, has made the problems of residential
self-governance less apparent—and in that sense more dangerous.
Community self-governance also increases the pressure on community composition from its already substantial baseline—race, ethnicity, and
184
See Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empowered Participatory Government 10–12, 28 (2003) (reviewing experiments in participatory
budgeting and neighborhood participation and governance); Evan McKenzie, CommonInterest Housing in the Communities of Tomorrow, 14 Housing Pol’y Debate 203, 203–07
(2003) (describing rise of common interest community housing).
185
Robert H. Nelson, Private Neighborhoods and the Transformation of Local Government 259–78 (2005) [hereinafter Nelson, Private Neighborhoods].
186
See Ellickson, New Institutions, supra note 19, at 82–85 (proposing block-level associations); Ostrom, supra note 173, at 656–58, 664–65 (2010) (describing successful management of natural resources by farmers, residents, and other groups and endorsing non-state
resource governance in some situations).
187
See Franzese, supra note 19, at 591–92.
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other class-based characteristics are often misapplied proxies in this process. When owners benefit from limiting congestion rather than allowing
widespread access or participation, coordination costs are high, and interpersonal cooperation is vital, they will try to attract entrants perceived
to have the strongest tastes for contribution and capacity to integrate into
a cohesive group. Without some ability to predict the behaviors, preferences, and interests of others, the costs of governing through social capital skyrocket. These dynamics ratchet up preferences for homogeneity
among existing residents and dissuade minority newcomers who face increased hostility and risk of unequal status and participation. In the
scholarship on residential commons, legal scholars gloss over this issue,
noting seemingly without upset that “homogenous groups” typically experience greater success in producing local goods and require less government intervention.188 Yet, should we accept governing by homophily
in the service of social capital?
This “logic of homogeneity” may also be at work in Ostrom’s famous
examples of natural resource commons.189 Admittedly, it is difficult to
parse the relative contributions of culture, often machismo culture, from
the homogenizing influence of social capital-fueled commons governance. Nonetheless, the striking trend toward ethnic exclusion is noteworthy. Informally managed fishing grounds are often ethnically homogenous and community-managed acequias (irrigation ditches) in New
Mexico routinely employ gossip and social sanctions to keep water
rights from Anglo “newcomers” and within families and communities.190
In his account of the Maine lobster gangs, James Acheson describes how
the gangs, replete with social capital, harassed and cut the traps of entrants based in part on their ethnicity—even Italian and Canadian backgrounds were not sufficiently mainstream.191 The “kings” or leaders of
the lobster gangs also opposed “blacks, . . . hippies, welfare [recipients],

188

See Foster, supra note 64, at 91–92.
Carol Rose has criticized Ostrom’s commons for their propensity for rigid hierarchies,
sexism, or other non-egalitarian norms. See Rose, supra note 29, at 33–34.
190
Telephone Interview with Michael Cox, Assistant Professor, Dartmouth Coll. (Oct. 2,
2012); Telephone Interview with José A. Rivera, Professor, Univ. of N.M. (Oct. 5, 2012).
191
James M. Acheson, The Lobster Gangs of Maine 69 (1988). There are also barriers for
female lobster fishermen, though the 2007 recession has lowered the “glass gangway” as reduced profits have dissuaded young men. Chris Arnold, She’s No Man; She’s a Lobsterman,
Nat’l Pub. Radio (Aug. 19, 2012, 2:19 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/19/159175781/
fishing-for-lobsters-not-just-a-mans-game.
189

2013]

The Dark Side of Town

853

Russians, Jews, bureaucrats, Arabs, and Iran[ians].”192 Entrance is tightly controlled in these communities: in the traditional lobster gangs a boy
“inherits a place in his father’s gang,” and outsiders, without close affiliations to the community or gang, find entry difficult, if not impossible.193 While member selection is formally absent from Ostrom’s design
principles for community-governance, her writing describes common
culture and “rules of the game” as requisite to successful community
self-governance—indeed, in some accounts shared culture is part of the
definition of social capital.194
Some legal scholars and social capitalists have wrongly assumed that
social capital, properly nourished through participation and selfgovernance, will reduce factions and exclusionary harm.195 This misconception (and some of the appeal of social capital itself) hearkens to the
anti-federalist idea of civic virtue as the solution to factions. The antifederalists emphasized decentralization in small communities that would
enable the type of interaction necessary to promote civic virtue or “public happiness.”196 They championed deliberation and participation in
town meeting style government to educate citizens in civic virtue and
restrain self-interested factions from subverting the greater good.197
However, the anti-federalists recognized the tension between intensive
self-governance and diversity: Their model of deliberation and civic virtue explicitly required community homogeneity in terms of wealth, education, and power.198
If Elinor Ostrom showed that individuals can resolve collective action
problems absent legal or government institutions, the legal scholarship
has not resolved when, or whether, governing by social capital should
192

Acheson, supra note 191, at 61.
Id. at 65–68; see also Clark C. Gibson & Tomas Koontz, When “Community” Is Not
Enough: Institutions and Values in Community-Based Forest Management in Southern Indiana, 26 Hum. Ecology 621, 639–40 (1998) (describing how community-managed forest residential community required members to vouch for and pay the debts of applicants during a
five-year waiting period).
194
See Elinor Ostrom, Crafting Irrigation Institutions: Social Capital and Development
24–25, 29–30 (1990) (noting failure of commons with “individuals coming from different
regions . . . and ethnic and religious backgrounds” because “[no] social capital exists”).
195
See Putnam, supra note 2, at 23; Franzese, supra note 19.
196
For a description of the anti-federalist case, see Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 35–38 (1985).
197
See Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For 43–45 (Murray Dry ed.,
1981).
198
Sunstein, supra note 196 at 36.
193
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play this role in residential property.199 My account of social capital provides a more critical view of residential self-governance, and underscores the need for a substantial overlay of law, as well as other political
and institutional supports, to channel local collective action to socially
desirable means and ends. In a similar vein, scholars such as Carol Rose
and Sheila Foster have suggested the need for a minimal level of law
and government involvement to mitigate inegalitarianism and free-riding
in the commons.200 To make my analysis more concrete, the following
Sections consider proposals and initiatives in neighborhood direct democracy, block-level associations, and common interest communities.
A. Assessing Neighborhood Direct Democracy and Block Associations
Across the country, a number of neighborhood direct democracy initiatives have transferred regulatory responsibilities and service provision
to neighborhoods with the vision of resident self-governance bolstering
struggling urban areas.201 The Minneapolis Neighborhood Revitalization
Program (“NRP”), the most radical experiment in direct neighborhood
democracy to date, provided twenty million dollars per year for neighborhoods to form neighborhood associations, vote in boards, and create
and implement neighborhood action plans for affordable housing and
other revitalization efforts.202 The NRP envisioned that neighborhood
groups would build social capital that would enable them to realize city
planning goals with lower costs and higher resident satisfaction.203 On
balance, the Minneapolis NRP realized some significant successes.
There were, however, tradeoffs to neighborhood democracy that have
been neglected in the enthusiasm for grassroots governance. While the
NRP worked relatively well in homogenous neighborhoods, Edward G.
199

Ostrom’s self-governing natural resource commons are often found in countries with
unstable or inadequate markets, legal institutions, and financial resources that make selfgovernance attractive or necessary.
200
See Foster, supra note 64, at 89–90; Rose, supra note 29, at 44.
201
See Leighninger, supra note 78, at 5–6. See generally Section I.A.
202
Sarah Elwood, Neighborhood Revitalization Through ‘Collaboration’: Assessing the
Implications of Neoliberal Urban Policy at the Grassroots, 58 GeoJournal 121, 124 (2002).
203
The NRP Policy Board goals describe, “When people organize, collect and analyze information, and become more knowledgeable about their community, they can be significant
contributors to the revitalization of their neighborhood . . . . Neighborhood revitalization ultimately depends on a sense of neighborhood identity . . . .” See NRP, NRP Primer,
http://www.nrp.org/r2/aboutnrp/Basics/Primer.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2013); see also Nelson, Private Neighborhoods, supra note 185, at 269; Elwood, supra note 202, at 126–27.
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Goetz and Mara S. Sidney describe how in majority-tenant, racially and
economically diverse neighborhoods, white homeowners rapidly coordinated to constrict housing supply and exclude “undesirables” by halting
rehabilitation of multi-family buildings, gutting a nationally recognized
program of leasehold cooperatives, and funding conversions of rentals to
homes.204 In some areas, a hefty chunk of the NRP money funded grants
and subsidized loans to individual homeowners for home remodeling.205
Implicit bias and endogenous social dynamics no doubt influenced
neighborhood governance in the Minneapolis NRP, where white homeowners dominated boards and black homeowners, non-profits, and tenants who wished to participate were often shut out.206 However, status
may have also played a pivotal role because of the pressures of collective governance. The NRP required residents to self-organize and learn
local government functions with relatively thin legal frameworks and
limited institutional supports. Inegalitarianism may proliferate within institutions that govern through social capital in part to reduce the overwhelming costs of coordination. Social status lowers the costs of collective action by determining entrance and distributing authority and tasks
with quick and dirty, widely understood allocation rules.207 In a sense,
this tracks the unasked question in the Demsetz account of why property
rights emerge: How do people go about the process of setting up a prop204
Edward G. Goetz & Mara S. Sidney, The Impact of the Minneapolis Neighborhood Revitalization Program on Neighborhood Organizations 11–12 (1994); see also Elena Fagotto
& Archon Fung, Empowered Participation in Urban Governance: The Minneapolis Neighborhood Revitalization Program, 30 Int’l J. Urb. & Regional Res. 638, 645 (2006) (describing how property and business owners opposed the use of NRP funds for subsidized housing).
205
One of the goals of the NRP was to improve housing, so grants to individual owners
were not outside the program’s scope or expectations. However, the volume and value of
these grants suggest some degree of rent-seeking. One independent review concluded that
eighty percent of households assisted by the twenty million dollars in annual funds were
used to assist homeowners. See Jennifer Turnham & Jessica Bonjorni, Review of Neighborhood Revitalization Initiatives 38–39 (2004), available at http://www.nw.org/network/
pubs/studies/documents/revitalizationReview.pdf.
206
Low-income residents often lacked the resources, expertise, and campaign power to
win board positions, or lacked the social ties to assume committee positions. See Goetz &
Sidney, supra note 204, at 27–29.
207
There has been a recent wave of research on the use of status to overcome collective
action problems, but it focuses on how collective action contribution increases social status
and how free-riding decreases it. See Brent Simpson et al., Status Hierarchies and the Organization of Collective Action, 30 Soc. Theory 149, 158 (2012) (reviewing research on reputational gains from contribution to collective action and proposing that social status sequences
and coordinates collective action).
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erty system? Systems may, and often do, focus on first in time (earlier
entrants), prior property holdings, contribution to the group, experience,
or skill. But, frequently overlooked is the role of ex ante social status,
often proxied by characteristics such as race, gender, and social class, to
coordinate property rules and allocate roles and tasks.208
In light of the costs and pitfalls of governing through social capital, I
favor a more cabined role for neighborhood direct democracy programs,
with more limited grants of power and spending authority, robust institutional frameworks, enhanced political process protections, and in some
cases mandatory inclusion of non-profit and advocacy groups on governance boards. Compared to bold initiatives like the NRP, there is
greater promise in more modest devolutions that utilize existing local
government infrastructure and thicker institutional constraints. For example, several cities have piloted participatory budgeting where local
government organizes a group of neighborhood residents and community non-profits to propose ways to spend a limited, often modest, fund for
public infrastructure improvements and residents vote on the proposals.209
My analysis also has implications for prominent scholarly proposals
for neighborhood and block-level associations in older neighborhoods
that lack private homeowners associations. Bob Ellickson has advocated
creating block improvement districts (“BLIDs”) with narrow grants to
provide supplementary services, such as landscaping and street cleaning,
and to relax zoning restrictions.210 In my view, the risks of governing
through social capital underscore the prudence of Ellickson’s limited
grant of power to BLIDs to provide supplementary services and his proposals for supermajority voting and legal safeguards.211 I am skeptical,
however, of Ellickson’s related proposal for special Regulatory Block
Improvement Districts (“RBLIDs”) with regulatory and zoning power
and, more so, of Robert Nelson’s call for a nationwide system of neigh208
Notably, such systems may tend toward rigidity because mobility will create confusion
about governance authority and muddy the status rules themselves.
209
Residents in Chicago Ward 49 voted on how to spend a limited pool of infrastructure
improvement funds (approximately one million dollars) following an extensive process that
included the involvement of over fifty community groups to develop and oversee the participatory process. See Alderman Joe Moore, Participatory Budgeting, http://www.ward49.com/
participatory-budgeting (last visited Apr. 9, 2013).
210
See Ellickson, New Institutions, supra note 19, at 96–99.
211
See id. at 97–98, 103, 104 (proposing supermajority vote for BLID establishment and
application of common interest community law).

2013]

The Dark Side of Town

857

borhood associations to regulate land development and zoning, provide
core services including police, and assume ownership of city streets,
parks, and facilities.212 The small scale of the neighborhood and especially the block increases the ease with which both social capital and
factions develop, as Ellickson seems to intuit in his enumeration of voting and legal protections for BLIDs.213 Devolving regulatory and spending power directly to residents enhances the power of homeowner factions relative to developers and tenants (some of these proposals do not
allow resident tenants to vote), and can increase cartel-like restrictions
on housing supply.214 As the Minneapolis NRP experience reveals, there
is a substantial risk that urban neighborhood self-governance will displace tenants, many of whom live in city neighborhoods as result of exclusionary zoning and the resulting dearth of suburban rental apartments.
B. Common Interest Communities: Condominiums, Co-ops, and
Homeowners Associations
Self-governing private residential communities, such as homeowners
associations, condominiums, and co-ops, presumably should be incubators of positive social capital. Yet, high expectations for the realization
of community and democracy have given way to conflict, litigation, and
controversies over secession from public life.215 Disputes over noise,
dogs, cars, and garbage are common and call into question the assumption that social capital will encourage beneficial norms and secure cooperation.216 To the contrary, self-governance may intensify residential
212

See Nelson, Private Neighborhoods, supra note 185, at 259–68; Ellickson, New Institutions, supra note 19, at 99–100; Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal
to Replace Zoning With Private Collective Property Rights in Existing Neighborhoods, 7
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 827, 833–34, 873 (1999) [hereinafter Nelson, Existing Neighborhoods].
213
See Ellickson, New Institutions, supra note 19, at 97–99, 103–04.
214
It is not clear that developers will be as powerful in these micro-institutions for a variety of reasons: unlike local government officials, homeowners’ interests are narrowly focused
on their particular neighborhood or block and the common developer exaction of land or development in another part of town will not be of interest to RBLIDs or neighborhood associations. With respect to voting, Nelson’s proposal does not allow for tenant voting. See Nelson, Existing Neighborhoods, supra note 212, at 834. Ellickson’s limited grant BLID does
not allow tenant voting, but his regulatory RBLID requires approval by supermajorities of
owner and residents. Ellickson, New Institutions, supra note 19 at 99–100.
215
See Evan McKenzie, Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Residential
Private Government 26, 135 (1994).
216
See Domini Hedderman, Managing Conflicts Among Neighbors, N.J. Cooperator, Feb.
2007,
http://njcooperator.com/articles/31/1/Managing-Conflict-Among-Neighbors/Page1.
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discord.217 In a recent survey of common interest communities (“CICs”)
in Massachusetts, 64% of boards reported being threatened with at least
one lawsuit in the past five years and 22% were currently in litigation.218
Research by Henry Hansmann, and more recently by Michael Schill,
finds that co-operatives, a form of common interest community with
more intensive self-governance and common property than condominiums, trade at a sizeable discount to similar condominiums.219 Efficiency
and welfare losses from collective self-governance of common property,
among other factors, appear to be capitalized into lower co-operative
sale prices.220 This analysis reveals a problem unresolved by social capitalists: the proximity and interdependency that purportedly foster social
capital also breed conflict about uses, upkeep, and resident behavior.221
The predominant force resolving these conflicts is not social capital, but
the growing use of professional management agents.222
In a thought-provoking article, Paula Franzese has proposed that
common interest communities have greater legal free rein in order to
html. A California attorney described fistfights and other physical violence among residents
or between residents and resident-board members as “not uncommon.” Debora Vrana, The
Runaway Power of Homeowners Associations, MSN Real Estate, http://realestate.msn.
com/article.aspx?cp-documentid=13107752 (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).
217
Admittedly, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions as empirical study has been limited
and frequently undertaken by interested parties, such as trade associations for common interest communities.
218
Courtney L. Feldscher, Managing Conflict in Community Associations: The Who,
What, Where, When, and Why 10 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.
cairf.org/scholarships/feldscher_study.pdf (independent study of community associations).
219
See Henry Hansmann, Condominium and Cooperative Housing: Transactional Efficiency, Tax Subsidies, and Tenure Choice, 20 J. Legal Stud. 25, 68 (1991) (concluding that
the condominium form is somewhat more efficient than the cooperative form and requires a
smaller subsidy to make it competitive with rental); Michael H. Schill et al., The Condominium Versus Cooperative Puzzle: An Empirical Analysis of Housing in New York City, 36 J.
Legal Stud. 275, 309 (2007) (finding that cooperatives trade at a 13.4 percent discount to
condominiums). Hansmann also concludes that tax subsidies for ownership and rent control
encouraged the spread of condominiums and cooperatives despite the fact that rental is the
more efficient regime. See Hansmann, supra, at 69.
220
In addition, shared mortgage risk and restraints on resale (for example, co-op interview
requirements) reduce co-op value.
221
Moreover, governance by one’s peers poses its own problems. As one attorney observed, “When you have a neighbor being put in charge of you, it just breeds resentment.”
See Vrana, supra note 216 (internal quotation marks omitted).
222
The role of management agents, much neglected in property law, appears key to
providing an intermediary and a coordinator who acts in a professional, non-peer role. See
Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise 222 (1996) (noting growth of management
firms).
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promote, and capitalize upon, their social capital.223 In her view, social
capital is better nourished by a less heavy-handed legal framework than
the current panoply of state laws, conditions, covenants, and restrictions
(“CC&Rs”), and community rules.224 She recommends paring the common interest community legal declaration to a few core rules integral to
the community’s structure and allowing social capital to take root before
considering additional rules, as well as limiting association intervention
to nuisance-like activities.225 Franzese’s point is well taken that poor design and legal excess hinder common interest communities. However,
while some culling may be beneficial, I do not believe dramatically
downsizing formal law in favor of informal self-governance will ameliorate conflicts within these communities.
As a threshold matter, it is an unanswered empirical question whether
common interest community laws impede or foster positive social capital. Cross-country research by Frank Cross suggests that in some contexts law can increase trust by providing assurances and incentives for
trustworthy behavior.226 In later work, it seems Franzese agrees, as she
subsequently proposes more substantial legal protections for common
interest communities to promote trust.227 In my view, reducing common
interest community law to a minimal core increases opportunities for
rent-seeking. Supermajority voting requirements for amending key governance provisions, thick legal protections, and perhaps even the complexity of common interest community rules create if not formal checks
and balances, at least obstacles to radical redistribution at the hands of
resident factions (factions on the board are less constrained under some
CIC governing laws).228 In addition, state law, CC&Rs, and associational
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See Franzese, supra note 19, at 589–91.
See id at 591.
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See id. at 591–92.
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See Cross, supra note 128, at 1460.
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See Paula A. Franzese & Steven Siegel, Trust and Community: The Common Interest
Community as Metaphor and Paradox, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 1111, 1139–47 (2007) (recommending sunsetting developer-imposed servitude regimes to enable communities to select from
regulatory “templates” and adopting more homeowner protections).
228
Franzese’s desire to limit the board’s power seems to recognize the threat that selfinterested members will assume unpaid board positions or that social capital will develop
over time between board members and motivate rent-seeking or illiberalism. See Franzese,
supra note 19, at 591. However, narrowly circumscribing board authority also limits the
board’s power to address damaging spillovers of social capital and other conflicts among
residents.
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rules may have some degree of expressive value and communicate rule
of law expectations to members and boards.
Common interest communities also confront exclusionary proclivities
and incentives to reduce the costs of self-governance through homogeneity, often proxied by class-based characteristics.229 Reducing rules to a
minimal core increases the pressure on self-governance and the already
substantial demand for homogeneity. The limited reach and enforcement
of the federal Fair Housing Act, and some state fair housing statutes, do
not provide adequate redress.230 Accordingly, CIC laws that inhibit excessive development, or undesirable deployment, of social capital may
have substantial public value.
In closing, governing residential property through social capital, absent substantial institutional safeguards, may be an uneasy fit for developed and diverse societies. Perhaps these issues are part of the reason
why residential self-governance in the United States often does not look
much like Ostrom’s commons at all. Despite the popular enthusiasm for
grassroots governance, local micro-institutions often have limited powers and substantial legal constraints, and in some cases, such as Boston’s
famous Dudley Street Initiative, extensive support from government and
non-profit institutions.231 At the end of the day, governing through social
capital in residential micro-institutions is neither the apogee of civic
communitarianism nor the apocalypse of pluralism. It is an inexorable
part of the cost-savings necessitated by federal devolution and more limited fiscs for states and cities. And for my purposes, it is a point of reflection for the misguided expectations for social capital.

229
As Henry Hansmann observes, “[C]onflicts among members are a serious problem in
the governance of cooperatives and condominiums . . . [and] homogeneity of membership is
an important aid to viability.” Hansmann, supra note 222, at 201; see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1835, 1858–
59 (2006) (describing the exclusionary proclivities of common interest communities and
their use of “exclusionary amenities” such as golf clubs or Catholic universities to signal
their preferences for residents). For other accounts of preferences for residential exclusion,
see McKenzie, supra note 215, at 60–78; Reynolds Farley & William H. Frey, Changes in
the Segregation of Whites from Blacks During the 1980s: Small Steps Toward a More Integrated Society, 59 Am. Soc. Rev. 23, 28–29 (1994).
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See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631 (2006); John Yinger, Sustaining
the Fair Housing Act, 4 Cityscape 93, 98 (1999) (describing the history of the Fair Housing
Act and the underlying political compromises that led to an “almost ludicrous” lack of federal enforcement authority and capacity).
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See Elizabeth A. Taylor, Note, The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative and the
Power of Eminent Domain, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 1061, 1077–81 (1995).
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IV. RESIDENTIAL NORMS, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND SMALL REPUBLIC
THINKING
Using property law to promote social capital would be less troubling
if we could predict that the instrumentality of social capital would be reliably coupled with positive residential norms that would restrain dark
side dynamics. As discussed previously, social capital alone does not offer built-in constraints on bad behavior. In the residential context, civic
republican ideals cling to property, but imperfectly (some scholars have
suggested near-schizophrenically)232 and often faintly when one is contemplating her own residential property rather than her perceptions of
others’ obligations vis-à-vis their property. These shortcomings of public-minded sensibility in residential property are implicit in the vigorous
efforts of property scholars such as Gregory Alexander and Eduardo Peñalver to inculcate and disseminate public-regarding property norms.233
Anemic other-regarding residential norms create a substantial risk of
harm from social capital, particularly with respect to restraining housing
supply and entrance. Contrary to Madison, the problem of factions acting against the public good may not be due to small republics so much
as small republic thinking.
This point is most precisely understood through the sociological theory of roles. Roles entail shared norms for a given social position that define the expected behavior of the role-holder.234 In the constitutional arena, Bruce Ackerman has conceptualized mixed public citizen and private
citizen roles and explored their importance to a dualist Constitution.235 In
the residential context, the combination of private and public orientations and activities appears to produce a mixed public- and privateregarding residential property role. Commitments to equality, altruism,
or public citizenship ideals matter somewhat or sometimes. One can
point to examples of local action with respect to climate change or hu-
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See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57
S. Cal. L. Rev. 561, 561–62 (1984) (discussing how civic republican and economic perspectives stratify takings jurisprudence).
233
See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
Cornell L. Rev. 745, 760–73 (2009); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 Va. L.
Rev. 1889, 1963–64 (2005).
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See Ralph H. Turner, Role Theory, in Handbook of Sociological Theory 233, 233–34
(Jonathan H. Turner ed., 2001).
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See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 232–35 (1991).
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man rights.236 Also, abundant social capital may carry fewer negative externalities when the residential norm or role sub-type relates to certain
kinds of local public institutions. For example, local public (albeit limited-access) institutions such as schools and parks may orient residents
toward public-mindedness, at least with respect to these activities or
“sub-roles” (though notably any public citizenship attached to schools
has not secured de facto school desegregation). On balance, however,
the residential property role remains strongly local group-regarding and
private-regarding. It is more private-spirited and insular than how one
might conceive one’s role as a student or an African American or a national voter. The residential owner role in particular comprises a perceived prerogative to exert control over housing supply and the social
composition of residents.
Residential property norms are strongly, though not exclusively, rooted in the economics of residential ownership. Homeowners, as William
Fischel has described, have a strong motivation to maintain and enhance
the value of their large, undiversified assets: their homes.237 This excessive ownership stake encourages local investments that increase property
values, including beneficial contributions to schools and environmental
quality as well as harmful investments in racial exclusion and exclusionary zoning.238 It seems possible, even probable, that this defensiveness of
self-interest in one’s residential property fails to update in perfect Bayesian fashion and instead generalizes to a degree to other property contexts, including public residential contexts. These norms may spill over
to affect tenants, albeit more weakly.
Historical patterns of land collusion and exclusion also affect norms
of residential property behavior. Exclusionary zoning has been well established for decades and sanctioned by the Supreme Court.239 Given the
reinforcement of these norms through weak state and federal laws, it is
not surprising that land cartelization and NIMBYism are littlequestioned aspects of residential life. With respect to racial and ethnic
exclusion, there is a historical resonance to subordinating individual
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See, e.g., Taking the Local Road to Copenhagen: ICLEI USA’s Primer on the Role of
Local Governments in an International Climate Agreement, ICLEI Loc. Gov’ts for Sustainability USA, http://www.icleiusa.org/action-center/affecting-policy/international-policy-re
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See Fischel, supra note 31, at 3–19, 281.
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equality to residential property rights, the rhetoric of community, and local property values. Neighborhood associations and resident cooperation
are strongly associated with their long history of extra-legal and legal
maintenance of segregation.240 Indeed, exclusion may be one of the more
resonant ways that communities conceive of and experience collective
action.
These tendencies are exacerbated by the fact that for homeowners,
who represent a majority share of the national population, ownership is
conceptualized as a civic moment. Longstanding and influential sentiments dating to Jefferson and civic republicanism aver a corporeal land
stake in the country as a cultivator of civic capacity.241 According to Jefferson and other influential thinkers, property makes individuals trustworthy as democratic citizens and voters by assuring independence and
developing their civic faculties.242 Thus, it may be that with respect to
national or public citizenship, property ownership allows some resting
on your laurels—by becoming a property owner one has already discharged an important act of public citizenship. There is also an intuition,
correct in some contexts but not in others, that contributing to one’s local community substantially fulfills obligations to the national good.
Resident provision of certain local goods does enable government savings by shifting costs and service responsibilities to citizens. However,
this is a more modest contribution than the popular understanding of local activity and property ownership as realizing citizenship and democracy.243
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See Loewen, supra note 142; Sugrue, supra note 143, at 215–25.
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Today, social capital plays a similar role in cultural thought by reifying orientations toward individualistic or small republic thinking with
the inflated promise that group action yields national dividends. Social
capitalists allege that cooperating to advance private or local self-interest
in a group bound by social ties, trust, and norms of reciprocity creates
positive spillovers for national democracy, economy, and citizen flourishing.244 In the context of local working together, we can be less concerned about our obligations to the welfare of others, at least others beyond our group, because our very cooperation produces societal
benefits. Social capital theory thus entrenches private-regarding norms
by eliding a balancing between broader social benefits and local group
interests and claiming that action to advance the latter will provide the
former. This is perhaps the local resident version of “doing well by doing good.”
If self- or local-focus is largely due to economic incentives and historical determinants, one might question whether it matters if social capital
and small republic thinking suppress civic virtue that would not find expression regardless. This view neglects the noisiness and variability to
whether negative spillovers and collusion occur, based on the sum of
factors such as transaction costs, political influence, the magnitude of
the risk or effect on property values, the availability of explicit or implicit compensation, and residential norms. In addition, to the extent that
social capital advances a norm-neutral approach and encourages complacency toward broader social obligations, it may forestall positive
normative changes that would be capitalized into home prices and thereby lessen negative homeowner dynamics. For example, as prejudice
against black entry into majority-white communities decreases through
social movements and norm change, drops in housing prices from black
residents should also decrease, further attenuating homeowner opposition.245 These normative changes may be slower to occur in an age of
social capital thinking that elevates residential gemeinschaft to noble
civic purpose and depicts local, private-regarding activity as public citizenship.
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V. BEYOND GEMEINSCHAFT PROPERTY
The promise of social capital is its capacity to resolve prisoners’ dilemmas. Communities are better off when residents cooperate to clean
up parks, refrain from littering, and “keep eyes on the streets.”246 The
classic prisoners’ dilemma is two prisoners who are jointly best off by
cooperating to remain silent but face incentives to defect and secure
lighter sentences by unilaterally confessing. The prisoners’ dilemma illustrates how individuals acting rationally to advance their self-interest
may, as a group, end up worse off. Of course, as any economist recognizes, resolving the prisoners’ dilemma maximizes the prisoners’ joint
utility but does not speak to whether society would be better off if the
prisoners (let us assume they murdered innocent bystanders) remained in
prison. More precisely, the value of social capital to prisoners’ dilemmas
in residential property relies on the assumption that there are limited
negative externalities from cooperation or the precursors to cooperation.
This Article questions that assumption in light of historical and modern-day examples of residential social capital. Many property scholars
have aligned with social capitalists in the mission of promoting social
capital through property law and property institutions through social
capital.247 They endorse the view that property law and institutions
should produce local social capital by encouraging social interaction, increasing ownership, raising the costs of exit, and devolving governance
responsibilities to resident groups as “incubators of local social capital.”248 These accounts neglect the risks and costs of abundant local social capital and vesting control of property in solidaristic mini-societies.
The local civil society of bonding social capital is an internally cohesive
but nationally fragmented social structure that can close off property,
fuel factions and cartels, and dilute orientations toward national interests
and the public good. Cohesive social capital can also limit information
diffusion, suppress innovation, and chill dissent and non-conformity.249
And if communities must be tight-knit, gemeinschaft enclaves to prosper, then similarity and social proximity are the coin of the realm.
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To be clear, my claim is not that the rotary club should be stricken
from the local landscape, neighbors should structure their relations within formal rules, or that participatory local government initiatives and
community-building are inevitably harmful. Indisputably, the constituent
elements of social capital have value in some contexts. Social interaction
and informal regimes of sharing information and resources can convey
benefits to participants and to society. Certain types of social capital
lower the costs of political organizing. Social institutions, norms, and
conventions fill gaps within laws (and in some cases are law, properly
defined). It may be that social capital is more productive in contexts other than residential property, such as schools or families, where norms
and roles are better aligned with social welfare enhancement, substitutes
for social capital are scarce, or self-governance is critical to personal or
social identity. In the residential setting, perhaps social capital is best
understood as necessary but dangerous. Some baseline of social capital,
or at least some of its constituent elements, is necessary to residential
life. But excessive bonding capital or social capital tethered to bad
norms can wreak substantial harm.
If social capital is to retain a role in property law we must disaggregate its component parts and consider their individual utility in specific
residential contexts. I offer some preliminary thoughts here. Many of the
elements of social capital, such as social ties, particularized trust, civic
engagement, participation, and shared norms, can be employed for good
or ill. To develop useful legal constructs, we must turn to the task of particularizing these concepts and animating them with normative content.
Examples include norms of respecting personal property or Robert
Sampson’s research on diffuse norms of neighborhood social regulation.250 Disaggregation also necessitates context-specific analyses: the
scale and nature of the desired collective action affect the value of various elements of social capital. For example, research suggests that local
friendship ties increase neighborhood social cohesion but not participation in public events or willingness to address extra-local social problems.251 Perhaps the most intriguing and promising aspect of social capital for residential property is the development of generalized trust (the
belief that strangers can generally be trusted). Generalized trust creates
250
I thank Daniel Markovits for his comments about norms of respecting personal property. For more detail on norms of local social regulation, see Sampson, supra note 36, at 171–
72.
251
See id. at 216–17.
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the preconditions for broad social exchange, minimizes the need to make
provisions to control opportunistic behavior, creates fewer negative externalities than in-group trust or social ties, and has the potential to open
residential communities.252 In his empirical study of law and trust, Frank
Cross contends that law can serve as a bridging tie that promotes social
trust.253 Of course, promoting generalized trust is not invariably successful or positive.254 For example, generalized trust is both reciprocal to and
reliant on trustworthiness (without a substantial level of trustworthiness
in the population, generalized trust will not develop, and if it does it will
make residents vulnerable to deceit and trickery).
The balance of this Part considers the role of formal law and then
turns to potential objections to my account of social capital’s dark side
in residential property. I save the constructive task of developing typologies of social capital harm and corresponding legal correctives for future work. My contention here about law and social capital is plain: the
chief role of property law is not to promote social capital, at least in its
aggregate form, but to address its negative spillovers and illiberal effects. Carol Rose apprehends these concerns in her argument for a modest overlay of egalitarianism-protecting law in property commons.255 In
my view, the need for law to support and constrain residential selfgovernance and local social capital applies with substantial force, and
somewhat thicker legal institutions, than envisioned by Rose and certainly Dagan and Heller.256
Some aspects of the role of law in addressing social capital’s dark
side should not be controversial. Most social capitalists would support
legal protections against discrimination, such as the Fair Housing Act.
252
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More controversially, however, I suggest that high bonding social capital may necessitate laws to limit, diffuse, or deconstruct residential social capital (particularly when law cannot directly reach social capital
harms due to its design or enforcement, or when the costs of exit are
high).257 Alternatively, building social capital within a greater number of
distinct groups (that is, pluralism) has potential to lessen dark side dynamics; however, this does not translate well to the context of homogenous localities and the harms that spillover to groups outside the local
political process. This point underscores the importance of the level of
government that is involved. Depending on the particular issue and circumstances, negative social capital dynamics may benefit from legal
controls at different levels of government (for instance, there is little incentive for localities that gain from an exclusionary practice to adopt
laws restraining it, and intervention must come from federal or state
government). In some cases, swift legal intervention may be important
to subdue negative social capital dynamics before they spiral—and before participants capture the political process. With respect to residential
self-governance, formal law can mitigate illiberalism by providing
frameworks and rule infrastructure that lessen the cost of coordination
and cooperation, as well as the attendant pressures toward homogeneity
and status-based allocations. Legal institutions can also reduce “diversity anxiety” by providing rules, safeguards, and supports that signal rule
of law values and opportunities for recourse.
Addressing social capital harms requires a variety of legal tools, including direct restrictions, political process safeguards or correctives, incentives, and, in some instances, use of thicker institutions rather than
informal self-governance. Co-governance where groups manage property within a substantial framework of state-created law and oversight offers one intermediate solution to the problems of governing residential
property through social capital (notably, the much-vaunted commons of
the lobster gangs and fisheries have moved to co-governance and collaborative resource management with state and federal government).258
Concededly, legal design often strays from the optimal. Peter Schuck’s
work has examined the tendency of law to be heavy-handed, costly and
257
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258
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inefficient, reductionist due to the need for simple categorizations, and
biased in favor of powerful interests or the status quo.259 He also describes the shortcomings and unintended consequences of aggressive diversity programs.260 While I acknowledge the variable quality of law,
there are certainly legal frameworks that function effectively (that is,
more efficiently than no law). Indeed, well designed laws often fade to
the background precisely because they are working quietly and efficiently.
Some scholars have argued that law is at odds with social capital and
trust. Larry Ribstein asserts that law can discourage trust-creating social
capital in private and business associations by creating monitoring obligations and reducing exclusivity.261 Putnam’s work at times views law as
a sign of crumbling social capital rather than an independent, positive
social good.262 Yet, laws protecting individual rights and community
flourishing are not inevitably at odds. Robert Post describes how tort,
privacy, and other laws often simultaneously protect community and individuals by protecting essential community norms that constitute both
individuals and society.263 He observes that the interdependency between
individuals and community “makes possible a certain kind of human
dignity and autonomy that can exist only within the embrace of community norms.”264 In residential property, law and legal debate have often
vacillated in a binary fashion between community interests and individual rights.265 Perhaps properly understood, laws that safeguard individual
rights against the excesses of social capital also protect community, both
local territorial communities and broader communities of interest.
259

See Peter H. Schuck, The Limits of Law: Essays on Democratic Governance 4–6, 16–
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A. Political Organizing, Low-Income Communities, and Social Capital
One objection to my account is whether there is a better case for promoting social capital to support political organizing, particularly in lowincome communities that cannot afford substitutes for social capital (for
instance, private security and services). Barriers to organizing, including
low social capital, have undeniably disadvantaged low-income communities in the political process.266 Yet, it is questionable whether the target
of this Article, insular bonding social capital promoted through residential law, is a critical precursor of political organizing for poor neighborhoods. Dense and strong social ties and norms of reciprocity, key elements of social capital, are often present in disadvantaged
communities.267 Notably, research shows that such social capital can
create networks that integrate criminals into communities and lessen the
regulatory effect of neighborhood social cohesion and norms of social
control on crime.268 If low-income communities must bolster social capital, developing it through participation in public institutions or bridging
ties that draw citizens into broader political communities may be more
beneficial than promoting neighborhood bonding capital.269
The skills of organizing and institution-building, or agents with these
qualities, may be what is most important to political participation.270 As
Part III illustrates, residential self-governance does not reliably develop
residents’ institution-building capacities (and if it did, a question would
remain whether self-governance reduces the time, energy, and social
capital available for political organizing). Findings by Robert Sampson
underscore the important role of leaders and agents.271 The penetration
266
See generally Kay Lehman Schlozman et al., The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy (2012).
267
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of non-profit organizations, not strong and dense ties, predicts community collective action (for instance, protests, fundraisers, and neighborhood
events).272 Social capital is not absent from this process (a common vocabulary, minimal baseline of trust, and social networks help), but it is
not front and center. Research is just beginning to determine which types
of institutions produce positive outcomes in low-income communities.
Some of this scholarship can appear partisan, with proponents arguing
for favored institutions.273 Rather than micro-level social engineering, it
may be more beneficial to bluntly subsidize non-profit institutions and
allow politics, donations, and social forces to roughly sort out valuable
institutions for individual communities.
B. The Social Production of Neighborhood and Individual Capacity
Retreat from local social capital building may be problematic if high
social capital or property self-governance is critical to the social production of neighborhoods or the identity of residents. In some instances
where we find solidarity and social capital most appealing, the
non-market or non-legal nature of the interaction is critical to the production of social units and identities, such as family, friend, or congregation. For example, Bob Ellickson’s writing on social norms within the
family recognizes norms against monetization of services and contracting within the household as important to the social construction of the
household, as well as efficient.274 Similarly, hiring a professional PTA
would not be an effective substitute for a parent-led school association.
Much of the value of the PTA is that children observe their parents’ participation and infer the value of education.
Promoting local social capital or informal governance of residential
property does not appear comparably important to producing the social
unit of the neighborhood or individual identities.275 Most people rely on
nonterritorial communities for a sense of community and strong social
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ties.276 For example, in response to the survey question, “what are the
ways in which you get a real sense of belonging or sense of community,” over seventy percent of respondents cited family and non-neighbor
friends.277 Decades of research establish that neighborhoods are characterized by weak ties and residents have on average only a handful of
strong friendship ties in their community—and that they prefer it this
way.278 Even ethnic enclaves, long idealized in academia, serve primarily as way-stations that help new immigrants gain economic footing, at
which point they often depart.279 My claim here is not that the neighborhood—particularly resident involvement in local schools or organizations—invariably lacks meaning. It is that in view of the comparatively
weak construct of neighborhood and the organic social capital already
present in communities, retreat from promoting social capital is unlikely
to threaten individual or neighborhood identity. Moreover, indiscriminately devolving governance and public goods provision to residents appears as likely to harm as to benefit any communal social meaning vested in neighborhoods by breeding conflict.280
What about the role of social capital and collective action in developing individual capacities? This theory traces to John Stuart Mill’s asser276
See Avery M. Guest & Susan K. Wierzbicki, Social Ties at the Neighborhood Level:
Two Decades of GSS Evidence, 35 Urb. Aff. Rev. 92, 103 (1999). Data averaged across the
period of 1974–1996 reveal that more than one-quarter of respondents never spent a social
evening with neighbors, approximately 15% spent a social evening with neighbors once a
month, and approximately 12% several times a month. See id. at 99 tbl.1. The amount of socializing with friends is nearly double. See id. The comparatively weak attachment to neighborhood and community is also reflected in the mobility data with homeowners reporting a
median stay of only 8.2 years in each residence. See William M. Rohe et al., The Social
Benefits and Costs of Homeownership: A Critical Assessment of the Research 13 (Joint Ctr.
for Hous. Studies of Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. LIHO-01.12, 2001), available at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/liho01-12.pdf.
277
See Putnam, supra note 2, at 274, 275 fig.77. One-third or less of respondents cited local community or neighbors. See id.
278
The average person has approximately a dozen strong social ties but only two or three
of those ties are to neighbors. See I-Neighbors Encourages Local Bonds, MIT Tech Talk 3, 3
(2004), available at http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2004/techtalk49-1.pdf ; see also Sampson,
supra note 36, at 170–71 (noting how people desire trust with their neighbors but not necessarily thick ties); Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of
Home, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1093, 1122–24 (2009) (reviewing literature on weak ties in residential communities).
279
Notably, recent demographic trends show that more immigrants are settling directly in
the suburbs rather than gateway cities. See Marie Price & Lisa Benton-Short, Migrants to the
Metropolis 19 (2008).
280
See, e.g., supra Section III.A–B.
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tion that voluntary action educates citizens socially and democratically,
producing happier, more thoughtful and civic-minded individuals.281 My
analysis demonstrates more variable outcomes from group engagement
in residential settings. Voluntary action at times can produce illiberal
exclusion and collusive activity that provides an anti-social education.282
Even ostensibly positive or pro-social participation, such as serving on
one’s condominium board, frequently results in citizen-participants departing frustrated or demoralized, rather than brimming with civic gravitas. There is also no evidence that private-regarding residential norms
and local collective action (or collusion) create trust, goodwill, or prosocial motivations that enable generosity or wealth redistribution in other, non-residential contexts. The research on self-preferencing in-groups,
as well as social capital’s claim that local cooperation delivers national
dividends, give us little reason to anticipate that extra-local altruistic behavior will spring from residential solidarity.283
Even the evidence for increased happiness from social capital is thin.
In the Community Benchmark survey, Putnam reports that higher social
capital correlates with greater happiness and community satisfaction.284
However, this finding is subject to reverse causation, meaning that perhaps happier people are more likely to participate in activities, trust others, and possess social ties that would yield high social capital scores. A
well-established body of research on happiness also undermines a continuous positive relationship between social capital and happiness: while
social ties are important to happiness, people are highly individualized
in the amount of socializing they require, and many are happy with a
relatively small number of satisfying relationships.285 In addition, some
of the sociological research suggests that solidaristic communities can
be quite unhappy places for the successful who are burdened by requests
for favors, loans, and jobs.286
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C. Alternatives for Generalized Solidarity
Do property gemeinschafts and social capital encourage a valuable
sense of solidarity that may be otherwise lacking in modern society?
Solidarity may bind citizens together with shared purpose and mission
and encourage social contribution, redistribution, and individual and national flourishing. Putnam’s bridging social capital tracks the concept of
broad, cross-cutting solidarity.287 Without platforms for solidarity, collective identity may founder and endanger collective action, democratic
participation, and the polity. At the extreme, a society may develop anomie, where the collective conscience frays and norms and moral regulation no longer check individual appetites and ambitions.288
I am dubious of the threat of anomie or other solidarity harms from
more limited residential self-governance or decreased local social capital-building initiatives (assuming such efforts are even effective at creating social capital). First, other institutions, such as religion, schools, and
the workplace, appear at least as central, and likely more, to moral
norms and collectivism than residential property.289 Within the residential context, it is not evident that greater social distance and less dense
social ties threaten normlessness or anomie. At the larger residential
scale of cities, people rely on norms and shared moral conceptions to
navigate communities and coordinate interactions under conditions of
high population density and relative anonymity. For example, city residents develop widely understood norms to govern such issues as street
parking, queues, and behavior in public spaces—these norms have socializing as well as communicative value.290
Second, there are other, more encompassing forms of solidarity—
tight-knit localism is not the only option. Retreating from local solidarity
287

See Putnam, supra note 2, at 22–24.
See Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society 304–08 (1984) (describing anomie as an unusual and pathological social condition resulting from sudden economic or social change).
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See, e.g., supra Section V.B. Also, the narrative that diversity may threaten moral regulation and norms is questionable in the residential context if laments about the alienation and
social competition in homogenous American suburbs have any truth. See The Evolution of
Home Ownership, HomeInsight, http://www.homeinsight.com/details.asp?url_id=7 (last visited Mar. 7, 2013). Durkheim recognized the point that mechanical solidarity and greater
similarity can increase competition at least in the economic sense. See Durkheim, supra note
288, at 210.
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with chairs as clearly communicating property claims).
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may redirect political energy and identity outward and strengthen these
broader forms of solidarity. Scholars from a variety of disciplines have
described alternatives to gemeinschaft solidarity. Durkheim conceptualized “organic societies” based on complex, interdependent roles within
society with strong norms associated with the roles.291 Building on this
foundation, Portes and Vickstrom define organic solidarity as “universalistic rules and their embodiment in specific roles.”292 The interdependencies and specialization in organic society promote cohesion and
cooperation that secure solidarity.293 In a similar vein, Max Weber described bureaucracies as centralized, hierarchical organizations bound
together by rational laws, specialization in individual tasks and bureaucratic structure, and the demands of the tasks to be accomplished (although as Daniel Kreiss notes these ideals “rarely function in the real
world as they do on paper”).294
Solidarity may also come from common commitments or shared morals. Drawing from Aristotelian thought, philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre
writes of the shared moral community.295 Multiculturalism theorists suggest that shared values, history, and enthusiasm for “deep diversity”
may, if not create, at least sustain broader social solidarity.296 Generalized trust, or the belief that strangers can be trusted, binds societies together.297 And the sociological theory of professionalism describes the
development of the professional role and its normative focus on universalistic standards of science and expertise, service to the community, and
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service-delivery rather than the identity of the client.298 Although some
aspects of the professional role appear overstated, professionalism does
create commonality among professionals as well as between professionals and clients through the norm of impartial service-provision.
Stepping back, each of these theories is a form of generalized solidarity, by which I mean a form of solidarity that extends beyond one’s immediate group or territorial enclave. The source of generalized solidarity
in the accounts above varies between intensive social interdependencies
and universal, or at least broadly shared, norms, morals, or trust. For my
purposes, the point is not to endorse one choice but rather to discuss alternative sources of solidarity that sound not only in one’s community
but also in society more broadly. In the residential property setting, the
specific forms of generalized solidarity available vary by context, and
even geography, and multiple forms overlap and reinforce one another.
Admittedly, there is still much to learn about building generalized solidarity and I don’t claim that generalized solidarity will reliably trump
bonding capital (thought it may lessen its harms and convey other benefits to residential life). Rather, my claim is that generalized solidarity is
available to forestall any descent into anomie or normlessness.299
Interestingly, open property markets themselves can be one form of
generalized solidarity—though not the most broadly inclusive or necessarily the most desirable. Eighteenth-century economic writers described
a “gentle commerce” that brings people together and forces them to consider and account for the interests of far-flung others in order to trade.300
Carol Rose has posited a socializing role of property, writing about how
property markets can place people into contact with others far from their
geographic home and social niche and inculcate norms and trust.301 To
extend these ideas, it may be that property has the capacity not only to
socialize but also to help develop generalized solidarity by structuring
open markets and even playing fields of rules for participants to inter298
See Bryan S. Turner, Talcott Parsons, Universalism and the Educational Revolution:
Democracy Versus Professionalism, 44 Brit. J. Soc. 1, 14 (1993).
299
I have previously discussed the fact that alternative forms of solidarity or bridging ties
do not remedy or trump the dark side of local capital. In this section, my point is different:
alternative forms of solidarity hold other values for society and can substitute for any reductions in local social capital.
300
Carol M. Rose, Whither Commodification?, in Rethinking Commodification 402, 419
(Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005).
301
Id. at 402, 412–13, 419 (describing how imperfect information can encourage dense
social networks, long-term relationships, and more complex social structures).
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act.302 Indeed, this may be part of the intensely negative reaction to practices such as mortgage lending discrimination and redlining, which not
only impose individual harms but also sully the universalizing rules of
the market. The dark side of residential social capital offers a fresh perspective on the longstanding debate about market commodification and
alienation.303 Upon closer view, legal and market institutions may play a
larger socializing and liberalizing role in residential property than perceived by social capital exponents. And residential social capital, despite
its cheerful mantle of sociability, can assume anti-social, factional, and
illiberal forms.
CONCLUSION
Social capital has beguiled property law with its claims of efficiency
and self-governance through sociability and territorial cooperation. The
enthusiasm for social capital has obscured its costs and tradeoffs to
property markets, governance, and residential diversity. This Article offers a fuller accounting of the dark side of local social capital and its capacity to close off residential property. I contend that we should be skeptical of social capital’s primacy to property institutions (and vice versa),
realistic about its benefits, and cognizant of its capacity for harm. And if
social capital, and correspondingly my account of its dark side, proves
too nebulous to gain traction on property issues, we must turn from social capital and direct legal responses to context-specific harms and benefits.
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